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AbstrAct
Starting from the recent Philip Morris v. Uruguay award, this article tries 
to analyse the current status in investment arbitration of  certain doctrines 
(and/or principles) which are adopted by arbitral tribunals in order to give 
due weight to state interests. The reference applies to the concepts of  the 
right to regulate and of  the margin of  appreciation as well as to the principle 
of  proportionality. It will be argued that the right to regulate, which is today 
receiving growing attention by arbitrators, scholars and treaty drafters, still 
does not have the customary status which would entitle tribunals to apply it 
in the absence of  a normative basis. Also the margin of  appreciation, as te-
chnically developed by the European Court of  Human Rights, cannot find a 
place in investor-State disputes due to the very different framework in which 
arbitral tribunals operate if  compared to the ECtHR. However, the principle 
of  proportionality can offer a valuable legal tool to arbitrators entitling them 
to pay due deference with regard to state sovereignty.
Keywords: Investment arbitration. Indirect expropriation. Fair and equita-
ble treatment. Proportionality. Police powers. Right to regulate (or power 
to regulate). Margin of  appreciation. Deference. Sovereignty of  the States.
resumo
A partir da recente sentença arbitral Philip Morris v. Uruguai, este ar-
tigo analisa o estado atual de certas doutrinas (e / ou princípios) que são 
adotados pelos tribunais arbitrais para dar devido peso dos interesses do 
Estado na arbitragem de investimento. A referência aplica-se aos conceitos 
de direito de regular e à margem de apreciação, bem como ao princípio 
de proporcionalidade. Argumenta-se que o direito de regular, que está hoje 
recebendo crescente atenção dos árbitros, estudiosos do direito dos investi-
mentos e redatores de tratados, ainda assim não tem o valor consuetudinário 
que permitiria a sua aplicação pelos tribunais na ausência de uma base nor-
mativa. Também a margem de apreciação, como tem sido tecnicamente de-
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senvolvida pela Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos, 
não pode encontrar um papel em disputas entre inves-
tidores e Estados devido ao quadro muito diferente em 
que os tribunais arbitrais operam. No entanto, o prin-
cípio de proporcionalidade pode oferecer uma valiosa 
ferramenta legal aos árbitros, permitindo-os considerar 
devidamente a soberania do Estado.
Palavras-chave: arbitragem; investimentos; proporcionali-
dade; poder de polícia; direito de regular.
1. IntroductIon
International investment arbitration has been stron-
gly criticized for not being adequately protective of  the 
general interests of  States and for being overly protec-
tive of  investors’ rights.1 Arbitrators have been accused 
of  interpreting and applying the standards of  treatment 
set forth in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in a 
pro-investor manner only.2 Not by mere coincidence, 
indeed, there is a large body of  literature3 regarding the 
1  See, inter alia, HOBER, Kay. Does Investment Arbitration 
Have a Future?. In: BUNGENBERG Marc et al. (Ed.). International 
Investment Law. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2015; VAN HARTEN, Gus. In-
vestment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007. p. 1; GIARDINA, Andrea. L’arbitrato internazionale 
in materia di investimenti: impetuosi sviluppi e qualche problema. 
In: BOSCHIERO, Nerina; LUZZATTO, Riccardo. (Ed.). I rapporti 
economici internazionali e l’evoluzione del loro regime giuridico. Napoli: Edi-
toriale Scientifica, 2008. p. 319; FRANCK, Susan. The Legitimacy 
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Interna-
tional Law Through Inconstistent Decisions. Fordham Law Review, 
p. 1521, 2005; MARKERT, Lars. The Crucial Question of  Future 
Investment Treaties: Balancing Investors’ Rights and Regulatory 
Interests of  Host States. European Yearbook of  International Economic 
Law, p. 145, 2011; EL BOUDOUHI, Saida. L’intéret general et les 
règles substantielles de protection des investissements. Annuaire fran-
çais de droit international, v. 51, p. 542, 2005; COLLINS, David. The 
line of  equilibrium: improving the legitimacy of  investment treaty 
arbitration through the application of  the WTO’s general excep-
tions. Arbitration International, v. 32, p. 575, 2016; PAVONI, Riccardo. 
Environmental Rights, Sustainable Development, and Investor-
State Case Law: A Critical Appraisal. In: DUPUY, Pierre-Marie; 
PETERSMANN, Ernst-Ulrich; FRANCIONI, Francesco. (Ed.). 
Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration. Oxford 
University Press, 2009. p. 525.
2  See the debate and the related analysis contained in SCHULTZ, 
Thomas; DUPONT, Cédric. Investment Arbitration: Promoting 
the Rule of  Law or Over-Empowering Investors? A Quantitative 
Empirical Study. European Journal of  International Law, v. 25, p. 1147, 
2014. See also KOSKENNIEMI, Martti. It’s not the Cases, It’s the 
System. The Journal of  World Investment & Trade, v. 18, p. 343, 2017.
3  See, inter alia, ACCONCI, Pia. The integration of  non-invest-
ment concerns as an opportunity for the modernization of  inter-
ways in which arbitral tribunals could properly balance 
the interests at stake in investment disputes and ensure 
that States’ concerns are duly taken into account in final 
decisions. The main issue faced by these scholarly works 
regards the fact that several existing BITs have concise 
wordings which often do not seem to outwardly justify 
such a balanced reading.
Recent arbitral practice, however, shows a willing-
ness to react to criticisms. Various awards4 contain se-
veral references to the necessity of  applying standards 
of  treatment in a way that protects the so-called non-
-commercial values (i.e. values not pertaining to the 
protection of  property but relating to the safeguard of  
other essential interests such as environment and hu-
man health).5 Tribunals have started giving due weight 
to  States’ reasons for the enactment of  measures that 
can cause damage to foreign investors.6 Particular im-
portance appears to have been given, in this regard, to 
some concepts that are only recently taking shape in 
arbitral practice, such as the right to regulate, the mar-
gin of  appreciation and the principle of  proportionali-
national investment law: is a multilateral approach desirable?. In: 
SACERDOTI, Giorgio et al. (Ed.). General Interests of  Host States 
in International Investment Law. Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
p. 165; TANZI, Attila. On Balancing Foreign Investment Treaties 
with Public Interests in Recent Arbitration Case Law in the Public 
Utilities Sector. The Law and Practice of  International Courts and Tri-
bunals, v. 11, p. 47, 2012; WAGNER, Markus. Regulatory Space in 
International Trade Law and International Investment Law. Uni-
versity of  Pennsylvania Journal of  International Law, v. 36, p. 1, 2015; 
PUMA, Giuseppe. Human Rights and Investment Law: Attempts at 
Harmonization Through a Difficult Dialogue Between Arbitrators 
and Human Rights Tribunals. In: ARCARI, Maurizio; BALMOND, 
Louis. (Ed.). Judicial Dialogue in the International Legal Order. Editori-
ale Scientifica, 2014. p. 193; VADI, Valentina; GRUSZCZYNSKI, 
Lukasz. Sandards of  Review in International Investment Law and 
Arbitration: Multilevel Governance and the Commonweal. Journal 
of  International Economic Law, v. 16, p. 613, 2013.
4  See, e.g., Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bil-
bao Bizkaia Ur Parzerguoa v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/26, Award. 02/12/2016, paras. 618-625; Chemtura Corpora-
tion v. Government of  Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, 02/08/ 
2010; Methanex Corporation v. United States of  America, NAFTA/UN-
CITRAL, Award, 03/08/2005.
5  DI BENEDETTO, Saverio. International Investment Law and the 
Environment. Edward Elgar, 2013. p. 16-17; MONHEBURRUN, 
Nitish. Is investment arbitration an appropriate venue for environ-
mental issues? A Latin American perspective. Brazilian Journal of  
International Law, v. 10, p. 196, 2013; FOOTER, Mary. BITS and 
Pieces: Social and Environmental Protection in the Regulation of  
Foreign Investment. Michigan State Journal of  International Law, v. 18, 
p. 33, 2009. 
6  See BERNARDINI, Piero. Reforming Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: The Need to Balance Both Parties’ Interests. ICSID Re-
view – FILJ, v. 32, p. 38, 2017.
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ty. While varying in their content, all of  these concepts 
allow arbitrators to interpret standards of  treatment of  
foreign investors in a way that grants a certain degree 
of  deference to State actions. The right to regulate (also 
referred to as the “power to regulate” or the “State po-
lice powers doctrine”) has been defined as “the legal 
right exceptionally permitting the host [S]tate to regu-
late in derogation of  international commitments it has 
undertaken by means of  an investment agreement wi-
thout incurring a duty to compensate”7 in the presence 
of  State interests that are of  vital importance for the 
population involved. The margin of  appreciation is a 
doctrine developed by the European Court of  Human 
Rights (ECtHR). It consists in the recognition – in the 
presence of  specific requirements – of  a certain degree 
of  discretion to Contracting Parties by the Court when 
evaluating the legitimacy of  limitations to rights set 
forth in the European Convention of  Human Rights 
(ECHR) imposed by States for reasons of  public inte-
rest.8 Finally, in the context of  investment arbitration, 
the principle of  proportionality (which, as we will see 
below, is recognized as a general principle of  interna-
tional law by a large number of  authors) consists in the 
search for a balance between the State’s interests pro-
tected through a governmental action and the degree 
of  damage to investors’ rights which are going to be 
affected by such a measure.9 
7  TITI, Aikaterini. The Right to Regulate in International Invest-
ment Law. Oxford: Hart, Nomos, Dike, 2014. p. 33. In this regard, 
it is to be noted that it is questionable whether the police powers 
doctrine applies to all standards under an investment treaty, or only 
the expropriation standard. Howerver, in this article the doctrine is 
discussed only in relation to expropriation (which is the standard 
in relation to which the Philip Morris Tribunal made recourse to the 
right to regulate).
8  PALOMBINO, Fulvio Maria. Laicità dello Stato ed esposizione 
del crocifisso nella sentenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo 
nel caso Lautsi. Rivista di diritto internazionale, v. 93, p. 137-138, 
2010. See also BENVENISTI, Eyal. Margin of  Appreciation, Con-
sensus and Universal Standards. New York University Journal of  Interna-
tional Law and Politics, v. 31, p. 843, 1999; GREER, Steven. The margin 
of  appreciation: interpretation and discretion under the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Strasbourg: Council of  Europe Publishing, 2000; 
FEINGOLD, Cora. Doctrine of  Margin of  Appreciation and the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Notre Dame Law Review, 
v. 53, p. 90, 1977; HUTCHINSON, Michael. The Margin of  Ap-
preciation Doctrine in the European Court of  Human Rights. The 
Internatinoal and Comparative Law Quarterly, v. 48, p. 638, 1999; SAUL, 
Matthew. The European Court of  Human Rights’ Margin of  Ap-
preciation and the Processes of  National Parliaments. Human Rights 
Law Review, v. 15, p. 745, 2015.
9  For an in-depth analysis of  the legal foundation and of  the con-
tent of  the principle of  proportionality see PALOMBINO, Fulvio 
Maria. Il trattamento giusto ed equo degli investimenti stranieri, Il 
The purpose of  the present article is to understand 
whether and to what extent the above-mentioned doc-
trines, which are all tools employed by international 
arbitrators in order to show deference towards States’ 
sovereignty, apply in international investment arbitra-
tion and which one among them as a consequence can 
be applied by arbitrators in order to pay due respect 
to choices made by States in matters of  public interest. 
Such an analysis will start (second Section) from the award 
and the appended dissenting opinion recently issued in 
the Philip Morris v. Uruguay case. This dispute dealt with 
all the above concepts and is thus a good starting point 
to describe the state of  art of  the application of  such 
concepts in investment arbitration. On the basis of  the 
case study offered by the Philip Morris award,10 the ar-
ticle then proceeds to analyse in greater detail the ap-
plicability of  the power to regulate to cases of  indirect 
expropriation (third Section) and of  the margin of  appre-
ciation doctrine in cases involving the fair and equitable 
treatment standard (fourth Section). It will be demonstra-
ted that the analysis made by arbitral tribunals turns out 
to be mainly based on the principle of  proportionality 
– which, as it has been demonstrated in scholarship, is 
almost certainly a primary source of  international law. 
Hence, most attention should be paid to such a princi-
ple in arbitrators’ reasoning in order to reach the goal of  
being deferent towards State practice instead of  relying, 
as the Philip Morris Tribunal did, on doctrines the legal 
status of  which is still uncertain in international law.
2. PhiliP Morris v. UrUgUay And the recent 
deferentIAl ApproAch endorsed bY ArbItrAl 
trIbunAls
Mulino. 2012 (an English edition of  the book, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment and the Fabric of  General Principles, Asser – Springer, 
2017, is forthcoming). Other relevant texts analysing the principle 
and its possible legal foundation are HENCKELS, Caroline. Pro-
portionality and Deference in Investor-State Arbitration. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2015; BUCHELER, Gebhard. Proportionality in Investor-
State Arbitration. Oxford University Press, 2015; CANNIZZARO, 
Enzo. Il principio di proporzionalità nell’ordinamento Internazionale. Giuf-
frè, 2000.
10  Philip Morris Brands SÀRL, Philip Morris Products S.A. and 
Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of  Uruguay, ICSID Case No. 
Arb/10/7, Award, 08/07/2016. The Tribunal was composed of  
Prof. Piero Bernardini (President), Judge James Crawford and Mr. 
Gary Born.
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2.1. The Dispute and the Claims
The award issued on 8 July 2016 in the well-known 
Philip Morris v. Uruguay dispute is one of  the clearest 
examples of  the recent tendency to give particular 
weight to State reasons.11 The dispute was brought 
under the terms of  the Switzerland – Uruguay BIT12 
and concerned two measures enacted by Uruguay whi-
ch negatively affected tobacco industries operating in 
that Country. The first of  them, named “single presen-
tation requirement” precluded tobacco manufacturers 
from marketing more than one variant of  cigarettes per 
brand family.13 The second measure, entitled “80/80 re-
gulation”, increased the size of  graphic health warnings 
appearing on cigarettes packages from 50% to 80%.14 
As a consequence, only 20% of  cigarettes packs remai-
ned available for trademarks, logos and other informa-
tion.
According to the Claimants, the challenged measu-
res – inter alia – violated the obligations not to indirectly 
expropriate foreign investments (Art. 5 of  the BIT)15 
and to grant fair and equitable treatment to such in-
vestments (Art. 3(2) of  the BIT).16 With regard to the 
former violation, the Claimants stated that the measu-
res substantially deprived the investment of  its value 
rendering it a non-profitable business, something that 
11  For earlier comments to the decision see VOON, Tania. Philip 
Morris v. Uruguay: Implications for Public Health. Journal of  World 
Investment and Trade, v. 18, p. 320, 2017; MITCHELL, Kate. Philip 
Morris v. Uruguay: An Affirmation of  ‘Police Powers’ and ‘Regulatory 
Power in the Public Interest’ in International Investment Law. EJIL: 
Talk, 2016.
12  Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Ori-
ental Republic of  Uruguay on the Reciprocal Promotion and Pro-
tection of  Investments, signed on 07/10/1988 and in force since 
22/04/1991.
13  Prior to the measure, Philip Morris (through its subsidiary 
Abal) sold in Uruguay various variants of  cigarettes, such as Mar-
lboro Gold, Marlboro Red, Marlboro Silver etc. Pursuant to the 
measures only one variant can be sold. See Philip Morris award, n. 
10 above, para. 10.
14  See Philip Morris award, para. 9 and 
15  Art. 5 of  the Switzerland – Uruguay BIT: “Neither of  the 
Contracting Parties shall take, either directly or indirectly, measures 
of  expropriation, nationalization or any other measure having the 
same nature or the same effect against investments belonging to in-
vestors of  the other Contracting Party, unless the measures are taken 
for the public benefit as established by law, on a non-discriminatory 
basis, and under due process of  law, and provided that provisions be 
made for effective and adequate compensation”. 
16  Art. 3(2) of  the Switzerland – Uruguay BIT: “Each Contract-
ing Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment within its territory 
of  the investments of  the investors of  the other Contracting Party”. 
is considered to be tantamount to expropriation (so-
-called indirect expropriation) and falls under the pro-
tection of  the BIT.17 Concerning the latter violation, 
Philip Morris averred that: (i) there is no proof  that the 
measures served a public purpose and, as a consequen-
ce, they are arbitrary; (ii) the measures undermined the 
Claimants’ legitimate expectation to use and enjoy their 
investment; and (iii) the measures destroyed the legal 
stability that Uruguay pledged in the BIT and on which 
the Claimants relied.
Uruguay replied claiming that the measures were 
enacted with the aim of  protecting human health, in 
accordance with the Uruguayan Constitution and the 
international commitments assumed by Uruguay wi-
thin the framework of  the World Health Organization 
(WHO).18 Moreover, both regulations were applied in 
a non-discriminatory manner to all tobacco companies 
and they amounted to a reasonable, good faith exer-
cise of  Uruguay’s sovereign prerogatives.19 The single 
presentation requirement was enacted with the purpo-
se of  avoiding that consumers could think that certain 
variants of  cigarettes are safer than others, while the 
80/80 regulation was adopted to increase consumer 
awareness of  the health risks related to tobacco con-
sumption.20 Both the measures being legitimate exerci-
ses of  sovereign power, in the Respondent’s view they 
cannot amount to a violation of  the investment treaty’s 
standards.21
2.2. The Tribunal’s Decision and the Dissenting 
Opinion Regarding the FET Violation
Both of  the claims were rejected by the Tribunal. 
With regard to the indirect expropriation claim, the Tri-
bunal firstly noted that the Claimants’ investment was 
not substantially deprived of  its value. In the Tribunal’s 
view, this factor, alone, would have been sufficient to 
dismiss the claim. However, the arbitrators introduced 
17  On the concept of  indirect expropriation see, inter alia, 
DOLZER, Rudolf. Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?. 
NYU Environmental Law Journal, v. 64, p. 64, 2002-2003; DE LUCA, 
Anna. Indirect expropriations and regulatory takings: what role for 
the “legitimate expectations” of  foreign investors?. In: SACERDO-
TI, Giorgio et al. (Ed.). General Interests of  Host States in International 
Investment Law. Cambridge University Press, 2014.
18  See para. 361 
19  See para. 355.
20  Para. 357 and 
21  See paras. 216-217. 
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“an additional reason in support of  the same conclu-
sion [...]. In the Tribunal’s view, the adoption of  the [c]
hallenged [m]easures by Uruguay was a valid exercise of  
the State’s police powers, with the consequence of  de-
feating the claim for expropriation under Article 5(1) of  
the BIT”.22 According to the Panel, the power to regu-
late is a customary rule of  international law and the BIT 
should be interpreted in accordance with it, pursuant 
to the provision of  Art. 31(3)(c) of  the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of  Treaties (VCLT), which sets 
forth that treaty provisions shall be interpreted in the 
light of  any relevant rules of  international law applica-
ble to the relations between the parties, including public 
international law. In the Tribunal’s view, the customa-
ry nature of  the police powers doctrine is proved by 
various factors. The first of  them is Article 10(5) of  
the 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on the Internatio-
nal Responsibility of  States for Injury to Aliens, whi-
ch states that “[a]n uncompensated taking of  property 
of  an alien or a deprivation of  the use or enjoyment 
of  property of  an alien which results from [...] the ac-
tion of  the competent authorities of  the State in the 
maintenance of  public order, health, or morality, shall 
not be considered wrongful” (provided that it is non-
-discriminatory).23 According to the Tribunal, the doc-
trine has been endorsed also in the Third Restatement 
of  the Foreign Relations Law of  the United States of  
1987, which provides that “[a] State is not responsible 
for loss of  property or for other economic disadvanta-
ge resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, 
forfeiture for crime, or other action of  the kind that 
is commonly accepted as within the police powers of  
states, if  it is not discriminatory”.24 Third, the Tribu-
nal mentioned the OECD working paper on “Indirect 
Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, stating that 
“it is an accepted principle of  customary international 
law that where economic injury results from a bona fide 
non-discriminatory regulation within the police power 
of  the State, compensation is not required”.25 Finally, 
the customary status of  the doctrine would be pro-
22  Philip Morris award, n. 10 above, para. 287.
23  Convention on the international responsibility of  states for 
injuries to aliens; draft no. 12, drafted by Louis B Sohn and Richard 
Baxter of  the Harvard Law School in 1961.
24  American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) Foreign Rela-
tions of  the United States, v. 1, para. 712, comment (g), 1987.
25  Philip Morris award, n. 10 above, para. 294, mentioning YANN-
ACA-SMALL, Catherine, “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right 
to Regulate” in International Investment Law, OECD Working Papers 
on International Investment Number 2004/4, p. 5, 2004.
ven by various investment awards, including Tecmed,26 
Saluka,27 Methanex28 and Chemtura,29 as well as by various 
provisions of  recent investment treaties (the content 
of  which will be better described below), including the 
2004 and 2012 US Model BITs,30 the 2004 Canada Mo-
del BIT,31 the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA)32 and the EU-Singapore 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA).33 
The Tribunal concluded that Uruguay’s measures 
had been adopted bona fide for the purpose of  protec-
ting public welfare, were non-discriminatory and were 
proportionate. They were not to be considered as an 
expropriation and, hence, did not give to the Claimants 
any right to be compensated, despite the existence of  a 
negative impact on their business.34
As to the alleged violation of  the fair and equitable 
treatment, the Tribunal recalled that both measures had 
been implemented for the protection of  public health 
and explained that, in making public policy determina-
tions, Uruguay enjoyed a certain margin of  apprecia-
tion, as it happens in the ECHR context for States whi-
ch, in order to protect a public interest, depart from the 
protection of  a conventional right.35 According to the 
26  Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, 
UNCITRAL, Award, 29/05/2003, para. 119.
27  Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Par-
tial Award, 17/03/2006, para. 255, 260, 262.
28  See n. 4 above, Part IV, Ch. D, para. 7.
29  See n. 4 above, para. 366.
30  See Art. 12(3), which states that, in matters regarding the pro-
tection of  the environment, “[t]he Parties recognize that each Party 
retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to regulatory, 
compliance, investigatory, and prosecutorial matters, and to make 
decisions regarding the allocation of  resources to enforcement with 
respect to other environmental matters determined to have high-
er priorities. Accordingly, the Parties understand that a Party is in 
compliance with paragraph 2 where a course of  action or inaction 
reflects a reasonable exercise of  such discretion, or results from a 
bona fide decision regarding the allocation of  resources”. 
31  See Annex B.13(1)(c), which states that “[e]xcept in rare cir-
cumstances, such as when a measure or series of  measures are so 
severe in the light of  their purpose that they cannot be reasonably 
viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith, non-dis-
criminatory measures of  a Party that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety 
and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation”.
32  See CETA, Annex 8-A (Expropriation), Art. 3. The CETA 
consolidated text is available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf. 
33  See EU-Singapore FTA, Annex 9-A (expropriation), Art. 2. 
The EU-Singapore FTA authentic text as of  May 2015 is available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961.
34  See Philip Morris award, n. 10 above, para. 305 
35  See Philip Morris award para. 398 
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Tribunal “[t]he responsibility for public health measu-
res rests with the government and investment tribunals 
should pay great deference to governmental judgments 
of  national needs in matters such as the protection of  
public health. In such cases respect is due to the discre-
tionary exercise of  sovereign power, not made irratio-
nally and not exercised in bad faith [...] involving many 
complex factors” (citations omitted).36 In light of  this 
approach, the majority of  the Tribunal did not find it 
necessary to decide whether the measures were actually 
able to reach the goals that were originally intended by 
the State, being sufficient that they were a good faith 
attempt to address a real public health concern.37 In the 
majority’s view “[h]ow a government requires the ack-
nowledged health risks of  products, such as tobacco, to 
be communicated to the persons at risk is a matter of  
public policy to be left to the appreciation of  the regu-
latory authority”.38 
In addition, the exercise of  the State’s normal regula-
tory power in the pursuance of  a public interest should 
not be seen as a violation of  legitimate expectations, as 
long as there is no violation of  specific undertakings as-
sumed by the State. “Manufacturers and distributors of  
harmful products such as cigarettes can have no expec-
tation that new and more onerous regulations will not 
be imposed, and certainly no commitments of  any kind 
were given by Uruguay to the Claimants”.39
As regards the alleged violation of  the fair and equi-
table treatment standard, however, Arbitrator Gary 
Born issued a strongly dissenting opinion, stating that 
– notwithstanding the undisputed sovereign regulatory 
authority of  Uruguay40 – the measures lacked propor-
tionality, i.e. they are extremely burdensome for inves-
tors in light of  the goals for which they have been enac-
ted. This consideration is mainly based on the fact that 
there is no evidence of  any prior study by Uruguay as to 
the adequacy of  the measures to reach their objectives. 
Moreover, Born argued that the recourse to the margin 
of  appreciation doctrine developed in the ECtHR ju-
36  See Philip Morris award para. 399.
37  See Philip Morris award para. 409.
38  See Philip Morris award para. 419
39  See Philip Morris award para. 429. This approach to legitimate 
expectations reflects the theory of  legitimate expectations by induc-
tion, perfectly explained by PALOMBINO, n. 9 above, p. 139  See, 
in this regard, Section 4 below.
40  See, in this regard, Born’s Dissenting Opinion appended to the 
Philip Morris award, para. 90.
risprudence is ill-suited for investment disputes.41 With 
respect to the protection of  propriety (as protected by 
Art. 1 of  Protocol 1 of  the ECHR),42 the margin of  
appreciation gives the Court the possibility of  broadly 
interpreting what constitutes a “public interest” that can 
allow a limitation of  the right of  propriety. However, in 
Born’s view, there was no provision in the text of  the 
BIT that is equivalent to the text of  Art. 1 Protocol 1 of  
the ECtHR. The BIT just set forth an obligation and an 
appropriate standard of  review. As a result the Tribunal 
should focus simply on the text of  the BIT. Such a text, 
of  course, involves a certain degree of  deference to-
wards State sovereignty, but this “is not a substitute for 
reasoned analysis [...]: deference to sovereign measures 
is the starting point, but not the ending point, of  eva-
luation of  fair and equitable treatment claims. Rather, 
a sensitive and nuanced consideration of  the nature of  
the governmental measure, the character and context of  
the governmental judgment, the relationship between 
the measure and its stated purpose, and the measure’s 
impact on protected investments is necessary”.43 In 
sum, what Born seems to suggest is to look at deferen-
ce as a part of  a broader proportionality analysis and 
not as the end of  the story when assessing a potential 
violation of  the FET standard. Indeed, the necessity of  
being deferent towards States’ sovereignty is certainly 
an element to be taken into account when evaluating 
whether a state measure is proportional to its goals, but 
it is not the only element. Born’s criticism to the award 
is therefore related to the fact that it seems only ba-
sed on deference, without taking into account the other 
prongs of  the proportionality analysis.
3. the relAtIonshIp between IndIrect 
exproprIAtIon And the power to regulAte
3.1. The Customary Nature of the Police Powers 
Doctrine and Its Applicability in Investment 
Arbitration Cases
41  See, in this regard, Born’s Dissenting Opinion appended to the 
Philip Morris award, para. 181 
42  See with regard to this article, PADELLETTI, Maria Luisa. 
Art. 1 Prot. 1. In: BARTOLE, Sergio; DE SENA, Pasquale; ZA-
GREBELSKY, Vladimiro. Commentario Breve alla Convenzione europea 
dei diritti dell’uomo. CEDAM, 2012. p. 791.
43  See Born’s Dissenting Opinion, n. 40 above, para. 142.
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The decision in Philip Morris, in its part concerning 
the indirect expropriation claim, suggests that – in the 
cases where certain State measures which investors may 
consider to be a deprivation of  property take place in 
the pursuance of  public interests and provided that such 
measures are proportional to their goals – the State’s 
measure cannot be considered tantamount to expropria-
tion and compensation is not due.44 It is worth recalling 
here that, according to the arbitrators, such a result may 
be reached by means of  recourse to the rule of  systemic 
interpretation set forth by Art. 31(3)(c) VCLT.
However, while in this author’s opinion the objective 
that the Tribunal wanted to achieve (i.e. deference to-
wards Uruguay’s sovereignty in matters of  essential pu-
blic interest) deserves praise, because it could improve 
the perception of  legitimacy of  investment arbitration 
both from the perspective of  States and from the pers-
pective of  the public opinion, the legal path followed 
by the Arbitrators does not seem entirely convincing. 
The reason for this puzzlement regarding the Tribunal’s 
legal reasoning stays in the fact that, in order to say that 
a government may substantially affect the value of  a 
property by means of  a general regulation without in-
curring a duty to compensate investors, an in-depth 
analysis on the customary nature of  the police powers 
doctrine and on the ways in which it may derogate from 
treaty obligations is required. Such an analysis should 
have been made, first, from a historical perspective and, 
second, on the basis of  a conflict of  norms approach. 
We will try to carry out this task in the present Sec-
tion, in order to understand whether the Philip Morris 
Tribunal’s approach may find a legal justification.
From the historical point of  view, it is undisputable 
that an afterthought concerning the goals and scope of  
44  For an analysis of  the concepts and differences between di-
rect and indirect expropriation see KNAHR, Christina. Indirect 
Expropriation in Recent Investment Arbitration. Austrian Review of  
International and European Law, v. 12, p. 85, 2007; ISAKOFF, Peter. 
Defining the Scope of  Indirect Expropriation for International In-
vestments. Global Business Law Review, v. 3, p. 189, 2013; FORTIER, 
Yves; DRYMER, Stephen. Indirect Expropriation in the Law of  In-
ternational Investment: I Know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor. 
ICSID Review – FILJ, v. 19, p. 293, 2004; KUNOY, Bjørn. Develop-
ments in Indirect Expropriation Case Law in ICSID Transnational 
Arbitration. Journal of  World Investment & Trade, v. 6, p. 467, 2005; 
HEISKANEN, Veijo. The Doctrine of  Indirect Expropriation in 
Light of  the Practice of  the Iran - United States Claims Tribunal. 
Journal of  World Investment & Trade, v. 8, p. 215, 2007; PUPOLIZIO, 
Ivan. The Right to an Unchanging World – Indirect Expropriation 
in International Investment Agreement and State Sovereignty. Vi-
enna Journal of  International Constitutional Law, v. 10, p. 143, 2016.
investment treaty protections is taking place. In their 
early age investment treaties contained “broad protec-
tion for foreign investors, with little or no reference to 
the need to balance investor protections against public 
policy goals”.45 Arbitrators looked at investment clai-
ms as ordinary commercial disputes. One of  the con-
sequences of  this approach was the application of  the 
“sole effects doctrine” to expropriation claims. Accor-
ding to this doctrine the mere fact that a deprivation of  
propriety (either direct or indirect) had taken place enti-
tled investors to compensation, regardless of  the State 
reasons behind the regulatory measures.46 Such a doctri-
ne, originally grounded in the jurisprudence of  the Iran-
-US Claims Tribunal,47 is perfectly explained in the Santa 
Elena award, where the Tribunal said that “expropria-
tory environmental measures – no matter how laudable 
and beneficial to society as a whole – are, in this respect, 
similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state 
may take in order to implement its policies: where pro-
perty is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, 
whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation 
45  ROBERTS, Anthea, Clash of  Paradigms: Actors and Analo-
gies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, American Journal of  In-
ternational Law, v. 107, p. 76, 2013. This attitude extremely favour-
able to investors has been described as a reaction to the extremely 
unprotective regime regarding foreign investments which took place 
at the period of  decolonization. Indeed, during that period, capital 
importing States accepted burdensome obligations towards foreign 
investors with the aim of  attracting foreign capital. See SACER-
DOTI, Giorgio, The Proliferation of  BITs: Conflicts of  Treaties, 
Proceedings and Awards, in SAUVANT, Karl, et al. (eds.), Appeals 
Mechanism in International Investment Disputes, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 133, 2008. On the other hand, it could be said 
that capital importing States did not understood how burdensome 
the obligations they were assuming would have revealed to be. See, 
in this regard, the policy paper issued by the South African govern-
ment in 2009, mentioned in MARKERT, n. 1 above, p. 146, foot-
note 5, where it is said that “the impact of  BITs on future policies 
[was] not critically evaluated. As a result the Executive entered into 
agreements that were heavily staked in favour of  investors without 
the necessary safeguards to preserve flexibility in a number of  policy 
areas.”
46  See, also for the case law mentioned therein, MOSTAFA, Bem. 
The Sole Effects Doctrine, Police Powers and Indirect Expropria-
tion under International Law. Australian International Law Journal, v. 
15, p. 279, 2008; YANNACA-SMALL, n. 25 above, p. 14-16; see 
also DOLZER, n. 17 above, p. 79  TITI, Aikaterini. Refining the 
Expropriation Clause: What Role for Proportionality?. 2017. p. 1. Dis-
ponível em: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2978530>. p. 12 discussed about the sole effects as a doctrine 
which is “agnostic about the purpose of  the host state measure and 
only examines the effect it has on the investor”.
47  See Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, Iran-
US Claims Tribunal, Decision, 22 June 1985, available at Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal Report, v. 6, p. 219 , 1985; Starrett Housing Corp. v. 
Iran, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Report, v. 16, p. 112, 1987.
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to pay compensation remains”.48
Today, however, the situation has dramatically chan-
ged. This is probably related to the fact that develo-
ped countries such as USA, Canada and Australia have 
started to be involved in investment arbitration cases 
as respondents.49 These countries, who allegedly have 
a bigger bargaining power when negotiating BITs, ori-
ginally accepted treaty wordings very favourable to in-
vestors, probably because they did not foresee that they 
could have become respondents in future investment 
arbitrations. This scenario, however, recently materiali-
zed. Hence, also from the side of  these countries, there 
is a new emphasis on the necessity to duly take into 
account the States’ sovereign functions in the evaluation 
of  the legitimacy of  regulatory measures50 enacted with 
the aim of  protecting essential public services and/or 
protecting human rights.51 We are thus facing “a return 
of  the State” in international investment law.52
The power to regulate, traces of  which can be found 
also in the practice of  the Iran-US Claims Tribunal,53 
emerged as a part of  this trend. The doctrine’s relevance 
48  Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Costa Rica, IC-
SID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, 17 February 2000, para. 
72. Similarly see Pope and Talbot Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Interim 
Award, 26/06/2000, para. 102; Patrick Mitchell v. The Democratic Re-
public of  Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Annulment Decision, 
01/11/2996, para. 53.
49  REISMAN, W Michael. The Empire Strikes Back: The Struggle 
to Reshape ISDS. 2017. p. 12. Disponível em: <https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2943514>; see also ROBERTS, 
n. 45 above, p. 78.
50  See SCHREUER, Christoph; KRIEBAUM, Ursula. From In-
dividual to Community Interest in International Investment Law. In: 
FASTENRATH, Ulrich et al. (Ed.). From Bilateralism to Community 
Interest: Essays in Honour of  Judge Bruno Simma. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011. p. 1079 (arguing that investment law is by no means 
exclusively governed by individual interests but is also receptive to 
community interest).
51  Essential public interests are those which are perceived as ex-
tremely important for the achievement of  a public goals and are usu-
ally aimed at ensuring the protection of  essential human rights. See, 
in this regard, RUBINI, Luca, L’impatto del GATS sulla regolazione 
nazionale dei servizi di interesse generale, Diritto del commercio interna-
zionale, v. 21, p. 376, 2007.
52 ALVAREZ, Jose E. The Return of  the State. Minnesota Journal 
of  International Law, v. 20, p. 223, 2011.
53  SEDCO Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Iran – United States 
Claims Tribunal, Decision, 27/03/1986, available at Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal Report, v. 9, p. 248. At 275 the Tribunal stated  that it is “an 
accepted principle of  international law that a State is not liable for 
economic injury which is a consequence of  bona fide ‘regulation’ 
within the accepted police powers of  the State”. See in this regard, 
ALDRICH, George, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of  
Property? The Decisions of  the Iran United States Claims Tribunal. 
American Journal of  International Law, v. 88, p. 609, 1994.
in the reasoning of  arbitral tribunals and in the text of  
modern investment treaties is today a matter of  fact.54 
Indeed, as already briefly mentioned, there are several 
decisions that have recognized the right to regulate as 
an essential attribute of  States. Among those, it is wor-
th recalling the reasoning of  the Tribunal in Chemtura, 
a dispute regarding the ban enacted by Canada with 
regard to a dangerous pesticide called lindane, which 
negatively affected the Claimant’s business. Arbitrators 
said that “[i]rrespective of  the existence of  a contrac-
tual deprivation, the Tribunal considers in any event 
that the measures challenged by the Claimant constitu-
ted a valid exercise of  the Respondent’s police powers 
[...]. The [State] took measures within its mandate, in 
a non-discriminatory manner, motivated by the aware-
ness of  the dangers presented by lindane for human 
health and environment”.55 A very similar wording was 
used in Methanex,56 where the Tribunal again recognized 
the customary nature of  the State police powers doctri-
ne, Saluka57 and Marvin Feldman.58 In this last decision, 
the Tribunal expressly made reference to the impossi-
bility for States to pay compensation in cases involving 
the exercise of  police powers. It said that “governments 
must be free to act in the broader public interest throu-
gh the protection of  the environment, new or modified 
tax regimes, the granting or withdrawal of  government 
subsidies, reductions or increases in tariff  levels, im-
position of  zoning restrictions and the like. Reasonable 
54  See WÄLDE, Thomas; KOLO, Abba. Environmental Regula-
tion, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking in International 
Law. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, v. 50, p. 811, 
2001; RATNER, Steven. Regulatory Takings in Institutional Con-
text: Beyond the Fear of  Fragmented International Law. American 
Journal of  International Law, v. 102, p. 475, 2008; MARLLES, Justin. 
Public Purpose, Private Losses: Regulatory Expropriation and En-
vironmental Regulation in International Investment Law. Journal of  
Transnational Law and Policy, v. 16, p. 275, 2006-2007.
55  Chemtura award, n. 4 above, paras. 265-266.
56  Methanex award, n. 4 above, Part. 4, Chapter D, Para 7, stating 
that “as a matter of  general international law, a non-discriminatory 
regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with 
due process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or in-
vestment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless spe-
cific commitments had been given by the regulating government to 
the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the 
government would refrain from such regulation”. 
57  See n. 27 above, para. 255, where it is said that “[i]t is now 
established in international law that States are not liable to pay com-
pensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of  their 
regulatory powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona 
fide regulations that are aimed at the general welfare”. See also paras. 
260 and 262 
58  See Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, 
Award, 16/12/2002, para. 103.
Z
A
RR
A
, G
io
va
nn
i. 
Ri
gh
t t
o 
Re
gu
lat
e, 
M
ar
gi
n 
of
 A
pp
re
cia
tio
n 
an
d 
Pr
op
or
tio
na
lit
y: 
Cu
rr
en
t S
ta
tu
s i
n 
In
ve
st
m
en
t A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
in
 L
ig
ht
 o
f 
Ph
ili
p 
M
or
ris
 v.
 U
ru
gu
ay
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
14
, n
. 2
, 2
01
7 
p.
 9
4-
12
0
103
governmental regulation of  this type cannot be achieved if  any 
business that is adversely affected may seek compensation” (em-
phasis added). 
Provisions excluding the expropriatory nature (and 
therefore the descending necessity of  compensation) 
of  regulatory measures may also be found in recent in-
vestment treaties. It is worth mentioning, in this regard, 
Art. 3 of  Annex 8-A of  the CETA, which states that 
“except in the rare circumstances when the impact of  
a measure or series of  measures is so severe in light 
of  its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, non-
-discriminatory measures of  a Party that are designed 
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objecti-
ves, such as health, safety and the environment do not 
constitute indirect expropriation”. Another very signifi-
cant provision pointing in this direction is set forth in 
Art. 23 of  the Morocco – Nigeria BIT of  3 December 
2016, entitled “Right to Regulate” and stating, in its first 
paragraph, that “the Host State has the right to take re-
gulatory or other measures to ensure that development 
in its territory is consistent with the goals and principles 
of  sustainable development, and with other legitimate 
social and economic policy objectives”. Similar rules 
can be found in several other recently drafted treaties, 
including the 2012 BIT between Canada and China,59 
the 2012 US Model BIT,60 the new Indian Model BIT 
of  2015,61 among many others.62
Is the above sufficient to reach the same conclusion 
of  the Philip Morris Tribunal, i.e. that the power to re-
gulate is a customary international law rule? In order 
to say that the right to regulate is a rule of  customary 
international law, it is necessary to first verify the exis-
tence of  the two elements of  custom, namely diuturnitas 
and opinio juris sive necessitatis.63 The former consists in 
the uniform repetition by the community of  States of  
a certain conduct, while the latter corresponds to the 
59  See Art. 33.
60  See Art. 12.
61  See the Indian Model Text for the Bilateral Investment Trea-
ty, Art. 16 (General Exceptions). See in this regard HANESSIAN, 
Grand; DUGGAL, Kabir. The Final 2015 Indian Model BIT: Is 
This the Change the World Wishes to See?. ICSID Review – FILJ, v. 
32, p. 218, 2017.
62  See the meaningful analysis carried out by TITI, n. 7 above, 
p. 53 ; see also references contained in COLLINS, n. 1 above, pp. 
579-580.
63  CONFORTI, Benedetto. Diritto Internazionale. 10. ed. Editori-
ale Scientifica, 2015. See also TREVES, Tullio. Customary International 
Law, Max Planck Enciclopedia of  Public International Law. 2010. Dis-
ponível em: <www.mpepil.com>.
perception (rectius, the conviction) of  the necessity and 
of  the binding nature of  such a conduct. From a rea-
ding of  the Philip Morris award, it seems that the mere 
reference to the 1961 Harvard Draft Convention, to the 
Third Restatement of  the Foreign Relations Law of  the 
United States of  1987, to the works of  the OECD, to 
the wording of  a limited number of  investment trea-
ties and to certain arbitral awards would be sufficient 
to prove the existence of  a custom, but the Tribunal 
avoided any kind of  discussion on the requirements of  
diuturnitas and opinio juris sive necessitatis, probably consi-
dering that their meeting was in re ipsa. 
However, contrary to the Tribunal’s approach, it is 
first of  all to be noted that the presence of  wordings 
recognizing the power to regulate in a number of  BITs 
and other non-binding legal texts – as well as in the text 
of  certain arbitral awards – is probably still insufficient 
to demonstrate that the requirement of  diuturnitas has 
been met. Indeed, such BITs still constitute a very limi-
ted percentage of  existing investment treaties, usually 
estimated as more than 3000.64 
In light of  the above, it seems that there are still few 
tangible elements which may prove helpful in demons-
trating that the community of  States considers the po-
lice powers doctrine as necessary and binding. It is not 
by chance, indeed, that still a limited number of  Tribu-
nals have recognized and applied the doctrine65 and that 
there is still disagreement among authors on the neces-
sity of  awarding compensation to investors in cases of  
State measures that, on the one hand, are enacted with 
the aim of  protecting public interests, but, on the other 
hand, actually deprive investors’ properties of  their va-
64  It is also worth noting that – among the newest investment 
treaties – the recent Brazilians Cooperation and Investment Facilita-
tion Agreements are silent on the matter and this could be seen as 
a confirmation of  the fact that not all governments feel it necessary 
to put a provision on the power to regulate in their recent draft of  
investment treaties. See, e.g., the 2015 treaties signed by Brazil and 
Angola and Brazil and Mozambique. For comments to Brazilian in-
vestment treaties see MONEBHURRUN, Nitish. Novelty in Inter-
national Investment Law: The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation 
and Facilitation of  Investments as Different International Invest-
ment Agreement Model. Journal of  International Dispute Settlement, v. 
8, p. 79, 2017.
65  See TITI, n. 7 above, p. 289, stating that “the wide cast of  
existing interpretations does not permit the deduction that tribunals 
accommodate host state policy space”. See also ACCONCI, n. 2 
above, p. 179, who adds that the application of  the doctrine “has not 
happened in a systematic way as only a few arbitral tribunals have 
allowed this kind of  derogation”.
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lue.66 Scholarly articles dealing with this question look at 
the power to regulate as something that is correct and 
desirable but still to be achieved.67
It can be said that there is an emerging trend towards 
the affirmation of  the police powers doctrine in inter-
national investment law, within which the Philip Morris 
award is perfectly integrated. Whether this trend will 
convert into a customary rule, however, it is too early to 
say. In this regard, therefore, the conclusion reached in 
the Philip Morris award seems rushed. Indeed, the tradi-
tional wording of  BITs (including Art. 5 of  the Swiss-
-Uruguayan BIT which was applied in Philip Morris) 
concerning expropriation, both direct and indirect, is 
usually very clear in stating that compensation is due in 
all the cases where an expropriation takes place.68 In this 
regard, it is to be noted that – in the presence of  this 
kind of  wording in expropriation clauses – States are 
not free to disregard an obligation that they previously 
freely assumed. A derogation69 to the obligation to pay 
compensation in cases of  expropriation is not allowed 
unless in the presence of  another rule of  internatio-
nal law (either conventional or customary) providing 
otherwise.70
It comes as a direct consequence of  the above that, 
contrary to the approach in Philip Morris, even if  one ad-
66 DE LUCA, n. 17 above, p. 71 uphold the idea that compen-
sation is always due, even in cases of  regulatory takings; similarly, 
see LEVESQUE, Céline. The inclusion of  GATT Article XX ex-
ceptions in IIAs: a potentially risky policy. In: ECHANDI, Rob-
erto; SAUVE’, Pierre. Prospects in International Investment Law and 
Policy. Cambridge University Press, 2013. p. 367-368. A different 
approach, however, seems to be sustained by other authors. Inter 
alia, see TESAURO, Giuseppe. Nazionalizzazioni e diritto Internazion-
ale. Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1976. p. 165-166, stating that cus-
tomary international law does not impose compensation in cases of  
general, non-discriminatory regulatory takings aimed at safeguard-
ing public interest. Also FRIGO, Manlio. Le limitazioni dei diritti dei 
privati nel diritto Internazionale. Milan: Giuffrè Editore, 2000. p. 120. 
67  TITI, n. 7 above, p. 298-303; DOLZER, Rudolf; BLOCH, Fe-
lix. Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments?. International 
Law FORUM du droit international, v. 5, p. 163-165, 2003.
68  This is, indeed, the thesis sustained by DE LUCA, n. 17 above, 
p. 58  The question of  the amount of  compensation to be paid by 
host States in cases of  expropriation has been analysed in-depth 
in a recent article by RATNER, Steven R. Compensation for Ex-
propriation in a World of  Investment Treaties: Beyond the Lawful/
Unlawful Distinction. 2017. Disponível em: <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2954146>.
69  PAULSSON, Jan. The Power of  States to Make Meaningful 
Promises to Foreigners. Journal of  International Dispute Settlement, v. 1, 
p. 341, 2010.
70  VILLIGER, Mark. Customary International Law and Treaties. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 1985. p. 215. 
mits that a customary rule on the right to regulate exists 
(something that is here denied), such a rule is not to 
be applied in investment arbitration by means of  a sys-
temic integration according to Art. 31(3)(c) VCLT. In-
deed, for the reasons outlined above, in the cases where 
BITs expressly set forth an obligation of  compensation, 
the possibility to deny compensation may not be affir-
med by way of  systemic interpretation (and, instead, a 
conflict of  norms approach is required). As explained 
by Simma and Kill, “[w]hen interpreting a treaty, the 
adjudicator draws out the specific norms memorialized 
in a treaty; when modifying a treaty, the adjudicator re-
places these treaty norms with others”.71 Art. 31(3)(c) 
requires interpreters to take into account rules of  inter-
national law applicable between the parties; it does not, 
however, authorize them to arbitrarily substitute the 
text of  a treaty with another rule of  international law. 
Art. 31(3)(c) is “a tool of  interpretation not explicitly 
vested with the power to modify”.72 In conclusion, sys-
temic interpretation does not seem the proper legal tool 
to introduce in investment arbitration a concept, such 
as the right to regulate, which requires a clear normative 
basis in order to be applied and to justify the absence of  
compensation in presence of  measures which substan-
tially affect the value of  investors’ property.
3.2. Proportionality as a Possible Tool to 
Take into Account State Interests in Indirect 
Expropriation Cases
71  SIMMA, Bruno; KILL, Theodore. Harmonizing Investment 
Protection and International Human Rights: First Steps Towards a 
Methodology. In: BINDER, Christina (et al.). International Investment 
Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of  Christoph Schreuer. 
Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 692.
72  SIMMA, Bruno; KILL, Theodore. Harmonizing Investment 
Protection and International Human Rights: First Steps Towards a 
Methodology. In: BINDER, Christina (et al.). International Investment 
Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of  Christoph Schreuer. 
Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 694. Similarly, see GRECO, Rob-
erta. The Impact of  the Human Right to Water on Investment Dis-
putes. Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, v. 98, p. 484, 2015. The useful-
ness of  art. 31(3)(c) has been defined as overestimated by PUMA, 
n. 3 above, p. 221. With regard to Art. 31 VCLT in investment ar-
bitration see, in general terms, ASCENSIO, Hervé. Article 31 of  
the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties and International 
Investment Law. ICSID Review – FILJ, v. 31, p. 366, 2016; Art. 31(3)
(c) is analysed in-depth by MCLACHLAN, Campbell. The Principle 
of  Systemic Integration and Art. 31(3)(c) of  the Vienna Conven-
tion. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, v. 54, p. 279, 2005; 
FOCARELLI, Carlo. Trattato di diritto Internazionale. Torino: UTET, 
2015. p. 407. 
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The above considerations, however, cannot lead us 
to exclude the possibility that State interests are duly 
taken into account by arbitrators when evaluating the 
existence of  an indirect expropriation. As we have seen 
above, it seems that if  the sovereign prerogatives of  
States are not duly taken into account in investment 
arbitration, this circumstance would lead the entire dis-
pute settlement mechanism to lose its legitimacy.73 The 
Philip Morris award shows that arbitrators were perfectly 
conscious of  this risk and this seems to have been the 
implied reason behind their very favourable approach 
toward the power to regulate doctrine. This effort, as 
well as the final conclusions reached by the Tribunal, as 
already said, deserves praise. It appears therefore neces-
sary to try to find a different legal justification aimed at 
reaching the same conclusion.
A possible solution to this problem has been 
identified in the application of  the principle of  
proportionality,74 which is only briefly mentioned in the 
part of  the Philip Morris award dealing with the indirect 
expropriation claim.75 As previously outlined, following 
73  See BROWER, Charles H. II, Obstacles and Pathways to 
Consideration of  the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Disputes. 
Yearbook of  International Investment Law and Policy, p. 347, 2008-2009.
74  The recourse to the principle of  proportionality to resolve this 
kind of  conflicts has been already proposed by SCHILL, Stephan; 
KINGSBURY, Benedict. Public Law Concepts to Balance Inves-
tors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions In the Public Interest: 
The Concept of  Proportionality, in SCHILL, Stephan (Ed.), Inter-
national Investment Law and Comparative Public Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010. p. 75; PELLET, Alain. Police Powers or the 
State’s Right to Regulate. In: KINNEAR, Meg et al. (Ed.). Building 
International Investment Law: The First 50 Years of  ICSID, Kluwer 
Law International. 2015. p. 458; STONE SWEET, Alex, DELLA 
CANANEA, Giacinto. Proportionality, General Principles of  Law, 
and Investor-State Arbitration: A Response to Jose Alvarez. NYU 
Journal of  International Law and Politics, v. 46, p. 914, 2014; similarly 
see HENCKELS, Caroline. Indirect Expropriation and the Right 
to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard 
of  Review in Investor-State Arbitration. Journal of  International Eco-
nomic Law, v. 15, p. 223, 2012. For an analysis of  proportionality in 
international investment law see HAN, Xiuli. The Application of  
the Principle of  Proportionality in Tecmed v. Mexico. Chinese Journal of  
International Law, v. 6, p. 635, 2007. An approach based on the con-
cept of  “reasonableness”, which per se involves also a proportion-
ality analysis has been sometimes endorsed also by the ICJ. See, in 
this regard, RUSSO, Deborah. Sull’uso della ragionevolezza da parte 
della Corte internazionale di giustizia nel controllo sull’esercizio dei 
poteri discrezionali degli stati. Rivista di diritto internazionale, v. 98, p. 
487, 2015. A balancing is, however, required in all cases where there 
is a contrast between two valid and existing rights. See, in this regard, 
PINO, Giorgio. Conflitto e bilanciamento tra diritti fondamentali: 
Una mappa dei problemi. Etica e politica, v. 8, p. 1, 2006.
75  See Philip Morris award, n. 10 above, para. 305, where the pro-
portionality of  the State measures is considered as one of  the re-
several authoritative scholars, it seems possible to iden-
tify the principle of  proportionality as a general prin-
ciple of  international law76 which has “permutations 
according to the specific area in which it operates”.77 
Being a primary source of  international law, such a 
principle is potentially able to interact on a paritarian 
level with treaty provisions on expropriation (which, of  
course, are a primary source of  international law too) 
and, as a consequence, to induce a certain reading of  
such clauses . 
In the context of  international investment law, pro-
portionality imposes a balancing of  interests aimed at 
understanding whether the sacrifice requested to in-
vestors is commensurate with the relevance of  the ob-
quirements for the application for the police powers doctrine.
76  See, also for reference to several other authorities pointing 
in the same direction, PALOMBINO, n. 9 above, p. 152 ; similarly 
see BEHARRY, Christina; KURITZKY, Melinda. Going Green: 
Managing the Environment Through International Investment Ar-
bitration. American University International Law Review, v. 30, p. 426, 
2015. This is not the place to carry out a meaningful analysis of  
proportionality in international law. However, suffice it to say that 
Palombino’s approach seems very convincing in light of  the fact that 
the balancing exercise based (explicitly or impliedly) on the three-
pronged test of  proportionality, as the same Author demonstrates, 
appears present in the vast majority of  the domestic system of  law, 
in EU law and in international law. A meaningful analysis of  the legal 
status of  proportionality has been recently carried out by TITI, n. 
46 above, p. 3 , who explained that proportionality has been seen 
in scholarship either as a general principle of  law (something that 
seems questionable to that author due to the facts that, as she ex-
plains at 18, she sees proportionality as absent from some domestic 
legal systems and that at the international level proportionality does 
not seem to her as universally accepted) or as an element of  mate-
rial law, applicable only if  incorporated in a particular set of  rules. 
Other authors, however, talked about different legal basis for the 
principle. See, inter alia, COHEN, Abby; SHANY, Yuval. A Develop-
ment of  Modest Proportions. The Application of  the Principle of  
Proportionality in the Targeted Killing Case. Journal of  International 
Criminal Justice, v. 5, p. 310, 2007, who talked about a customary rule; 
and CANNIZZARO, n. 9 above, p. 429 , who excludes the existence 
of  a general rule of  international law and discusses proportional-
ity as a balancing technique that is functional to the application of  
other rules of  international law; BUCHELER, n. 9 above, p. 28, 
talks of  proportionality as a general principle of  law recognized by 
civilized nations in the sense of  Art. 38(1)(c) of  the Statute of  the 
International Court of  Justice. Some authors criticize proportion-
ality because it allegedly involves a law-making function by judges 
that should be avoided. See, inter alia, COTTIER, Thomas et al. The 
Principle of  Proportionality in International Law. NCCR Trade Working 
Paper No. 2012/38, 2012. p. 19. Finally, a strong critic to propor-
tionality has been made by SORNARAHAH, Mutucumaraswamy. 
Resistance and Change in the International Law of  Foreign Investment. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. p. 365. 
77  See PALOMBINO, n. 9 above, p. 152; CRAWFORD, Emily. 
Proportionality. In: WOLFRUM, Rudiger (Ed.). Max Planck Encyclo-
paedia of  Public International Law. 2013. Online version. 
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jectives of  the host State. Such a balancing exercise is 
to be carried out on the basis of  the satisfaction of  a 
three-pronged test: first, the State measure shall be con-
sidered suitable for reaching its goals (suitability); se-
cond, the measure shall be necessary, i.e. less restrictive 
of  investors’ interests (necessity); and, finally, it shall be 
proportional stricto sensu, i.e. – in concreto – it shall not 
have too restrictive effects on investors’ rights in com-
parison with the State interests that it seeks to protect.78 
As a matter of  principle, this means that if  the sacrifi-
ce imposed on the investor is disproportionate to the 
State’s objectives, compensation is due. Instead, if  there 
is a reasonable balance between the State’s goals and the 
sacrifices required from the investors (i.e. if  the objec-
tives of  the State’s measures are considered by the ad-
judicating authority so important as to justify a certain 
degree of  prejudice to investors’ rights), compensation 
is not due.
According to existing authorities, there are two ways 
in which the principle of  proportionality may be ap-
plied in relation to indirect expropriation. The first of  
them has been drawn in the well-known Tecmed award,79 
according to which “[a]fter establishing that regulatory 
actions and measures will not be initially excluded from 
the definition of  expropriatory acts, in addition to the 
negative financial impact of  such actions or measures, 
the Arbitral Tribunal will consider, in order to deter-
mine if  they are to be characterized as expropriatory, 
whether such actions or measures are proportional to 
the public interest presumably protected thereby and 
to the protection legally granted to investments, taking 
into account that the significance of  such an impact has 
a key role upon deciding the proportionality [...]. The-
re must be a reasonable relationship of  proportionality 
between the charge or weight imposed on the foreign 
investor and the aim sought to be realized by any expro-
priatory measure”. This award seems to imply that, as 
stated above, if  the State’s general (and non-discrimina-
tory) measures are not disproportionate, they could be 
classified as non-expropriatory and, hence, compensa-
tion is not warranted.
The second way in which the proportionality prin-
ciple could be applied in the present context has been 
proposed by Ursula Kriebaum.80 This author starts 
78  See TITI, n. 46 above, p. 3.
79  Tecmed award, n. 26 above, para. 122.
80  KRIEBAUM, Ursula. Regulatory Takings: Balancing the In-
terests of  the Investor and the State. Journal of  World Investment & 
from the assumption that the approach endorsed in 
the Tecmed award would lead us to an “all or nothing 
paradigm”, in virtue of  which an expropriation takes 
place if  the State measure is disproportionate (and, the-
refore, compensation is due) and vice-versa. However, 
in Kriebaum’s opinion, there are several cases which 
might be defined as borderline and in which – while a 
full compensation is inappropriate – the exclusion of  
any reimbursement for the investor is too burdensome 
a grievance for him. Hence, Kriebaum proposes the 
application of  the proportionality test not to the exis-
tence of  an indirect expropriation but to the amount 
of  compensation. In Kriebaum’s view, four elements 
ought to be taken into account in this evaluation.81 First 
one should look at the necessity and suitability of  the 
measure to reach the public purpose. Second, the ge-
nuineness of  the public purpose should be evaluated. 
Third, arbitrators should take into account the legiti-
mate expectations of  the investor generated by indu-
cements of  the host State. Finally, adjudicators should 
verify whether a special public interest to pay less than 
full compensation exists. After having carried out the 
above analysis, Tribunals should evaluate the amount of  
compensation. In Kriebaum’s words: “[t]he maximum 
would be full compensation. Conversely, if  an expro-
priation is the least invasive suitable means to achieve 
the public purpose, compensation will be lower depen-
ding on how urgent and genuine the public interest to 
expropriate is. In addition, an exceptional public inte-
rest to expropriate with less than full compensation will 
also affect the amount of  compensation”.82
With regard to the above approaches, it should be 
noted that Prof. Kriebaum’s view – even if  theoretically 
stimulating – seems to be difficult to apply in practi-
ce. In the absence of  objective parameters, arbitrators 
would decide the amount of  compensation to be paid 
on the basis of  a merely subjective perception of  the 
case at hand. Compensation, which by definition con-
sists  in a certain amount of  money to be anchored to 
the violation of  specific legal parameters, would turn 
out to be determined by an equitable decision of  arbi-
trators with the risk of  undermining the acceptability of  
Trade, v. 8, p. 717, 2007.
81  KRIEBAUM, Ursula. Regulatory Takings: Balancing the In-
terests of  the Investor and the State. Journal of  World Investment & 
Trade, v. 8, p. 732, 2007.
82  KRIEBAUM, Ursula. Regulatory Takings: Balancing the In-
terests of  the Investor and the State. Journal of  World Investment & 
Trade, v. 8, p. 743, 2007.
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the resulting award. A proportionality analysis concer-
ning the amount of  compensation has been sometimes 
carried out by the ECtHR, which in some cases justi-
fied a graduation of  the amount to be compensated on 
the basis of  the circumstances of  the case at hand.83 In 
this regard, it is to be noted that, as reported by various 
scholars, a uniform criterion emerging from the Court’s 
jurisprudence did not emerge, and that is why the same 
ECtHR is applying a more rigid approach (i.e. mainly 
anchored to the full economic value of  the expropriated 
asset) in the evaluation of  the amount of  compensation 
to be paid.84 It is not surprising, therefore, that such an 
approach did not find application in the practice of  in-
vestment tribunals. 
The Tecmed Tribunal’s approach, instead, seems to 
be the most suitable for indirect expropriation cases.85 
Such an approach has found approval also in other de-
cisions, such as LG&E, where the Tribunal stated that 
“[w]ith respect to the power of  the State to adopt its 
policies, it can generally be said that the State has the ri-
ght to adopt measures having a social or general welfare 
purpose. In such a case, the measure must be accep-
ted without any imposition of  liability, except in cases 
where the State’s action is obviously disproportionate to 
the need being addressed”.86 A similar position has been 
taken in Azurix87 and recently also the German Consti-
tutional Court in Vattenfall seems to have affirmed that 
disproportionate expropriations need to be compensa-
ted.88 This means that, on the basis of  the aforementio-
ned three-step structure of  proportionality, and starting 
from the necessary assumption that States supposedly 
83  See, inter alia, ECtHR Kozacioglu v. Turquie, No. 2334/03, 
19/02/2009, para. 64. See also the Case of  the Holy Monastries v. Greece, 
No. 13092/87 and 13984/88, 09/12/1994, paras. 70-71 (in which 
the Court has also recognized the possibility of  expropriation with-
out compensation in exceptional circumstances).  
84  See, inter alia and also for other references, PADELLETTI, n. 
42 above, pp. 800-801; ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Scordino v. Italie, N. 
36813/97, 21/03/2006, para. 96.
85  The diffusion of  this approach, also known as “all or nothing 
approach” is recognized also by TITI, n. 46 above, p. 14.
86  LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International 
Inc. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision 
on Liability, 03/10/2006, para. 195.
87  Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12, Award, 14/07/2006, paras. 311-312 and 322.
88  See Vattenfall v. Germany, Judgment of  the German Consti-
tutional Court, 06/12/2016. Available at: http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7894.pdf. For a comment 
see LAVRANOS, Nikos. The German Constitutional Court in the Vat-
tenfall Case: Lessons for the ECT Vattenfall Tribunal. 2016. Available 
at: www.kluwerarbitrationblog.com.
operate with the sole goal of  safeguarding public in-
terest, tribunals should be able to evaluate whether an 
investor suffered a too onerous prejudice89 with respect 
to the host State’s goals. If  investors have suffered an 
unproportionate damage, the regulatory measures shall 
be classified as expropriatory (and vice-versa). This kind 
of  approach could have been also applied by the Philip 
Morris Tribunal in order to obtain an identical result to 
the one that it gained by applying the power to regu-
late doctrine and, in this author’s opinion, this would 
have rendered the decision more legitimate. Indeed, it 
is arguable that the sacrifice imposed to Philip Morris 
was proportionate to the objectives of  the measures 
enacted by Uruguay, i.e. the protection of  the health of  
the population, and that, therefore, the measures were 
not expropriatory and no compensation was due to the 
Claimants. Indeed, Uruguay was, in its quality of  the 
ultimate guarantor of  the health of  its population, fully 
entitled to enact measures that – in the name of  the 
protection of  the right to health – generated a certain 
degree of  prejudice to tobacco producers. Such a preju-
dice, as recognized by the same arbitral Tribunal, could 
have been expected by investors acting in a sensitive 
area such as the sale of  tobacco products and is there-
fore not unreasonable in light of  the importance of  the 
goals pursued by the State. 
4. the stAte mArgIn of ApprecIAtIon 
regArdIng vIolAtIons of the fAIr And 
equItAble treAtment stAndArd: A dIfferent 
nAme for the proportIonAlItY AnAlYsIs?
The police powers doctrine, examined in the pre-
vious Section, is not the only legal tool employed in the 
Philip Morris award in order to show deference towards 
Uruguay’s sovereignty.
Indeed, in the second relevant part of  the Philip 
Morris award, which concerns the possible violation 
of  the fair and equitable treatment standard90 (in par-
89  See, also with regard to the degree of  prejudice that investors 
might sustain, PALOMBINO, n. 9 above, p. 169-171.
90  The content and the legal status of  the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard is subject to huge debate in international investment 
law scholarship. See, inter alia, PALOMBINO, n. 9 above, p. 1., TU-
DOR. The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Invest-
ment Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 1; KLÄGER, 
Roland. ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law. 
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ticular with regard to the alleged arbitrariness of  the 
measures and the investors’ legitimate expectations that 
the legal framework existing in Uruguay regulating the 
commerce of  cigarettes would not have changed), the 
majority of  the Philip Morris Tribunal considered that 
Uruguay enjoyed a margin of  appreciation in determi-
ning whether the single presentation requirement and 
the 80/80 regulation were necessary for safeguarding 
public health. In the majority’s view, the mere existence 
of  this margin of  appreciation is sufficient to render li-
cit Uruguay’s choices and conducts. For this reason, the 
majority considered it unnecessary to evaluate whether 
the measures were actually proportional with respect to 
their goal: it was sufficient that the host State conside-
red that they were so. In this regard, as per the recourse 
to the police powers doctrine, the majority’s decision on 
the FET claim, based on the recourse to the concept 
of  margin of  appreciation, appears to be driven by the 
same rationale which inspired the expropriation deci-
sion: being deferent towards Uruguayan sovereignty. 
However, as already said with regard to the power 
to regulate, it is the opinion of  the present author that 
while the deferential approach assumed by the Tribu-
nal with regard to Uruguayan policy choices is admi-
rable, the legal arguments employed by the arbitrators 
are controversial. In this Section, therefore, we will try 
to demonstrate that recourse to the margin of  appre-
ciation doctrine as developed in the ECtHR is proba-
bly inappropriate in the context of  arbitrations arising 
from the violation of  BIT standards. Such a recourse 
is, moreover, arguably useless, due to the fact that – as 
for the abovementioned expropriation claim – the goal 
of  being deferent towards State policy choices may be 
equally reached by applying the principle of  proportio-
nality, the applicability of  which in investment disputes 
is undisputed. 
In order to assess the decision of  the Philip Morris 
Tribunal on the fair and equitable treatment violation, 
we will therefore need to make a careful analysis on 
the margin of  appreciation doctrine and on the ways in 
which it has been developed by the ECtHR and applied 
in different context.
In this Section we try to demonstrate that the thesis 
supporting the applicability of  the margin of  apprecia-
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. p. 1; PAPARINSKIS, 
Martins. The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable 
Treatmen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 1. 
tion in investment arbitration probably refers to such a 
doctrine in an a-technical way, i.e. as a mere balancing 
technique involving a certain degree of  deference to-
wards State sovereignty, and not as it has been techni-
cally developed by the ECtHR. We will therefore give 
evidence of  the circumstance that, in the investment 
arbitration context, the concept seems to turn out to be 
equal to the proportionality analysis which already takes 
place in the evaluation of  FET violations and which 
already involves a deferential approach towards States’ 
policy choices. As a consequence, the reference to the 
label “margin of  appreciation” in international invest-
ment seems to be misleading.
4.1. The Meaning(s) of the Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine
Notwithstanding the fact that the Tribunal based its 
decision on the alleged FET violation on the applica-
tion of  this doctrine, there is no definition of  the mar-
gin of  appreciation in the Philip Morris award. Indeed, 
defining the margin of  appreciation doctrine is not an 
easy task. While the ECtHR case law and the related 
literature are rich in references to this concept, very few 
of  these sources have attempted to offer a definition 
of  it. The following survey of  the existing authorities, 
however, seems to suggest that reference to the margin 
of  appreciation has not taken place in one way only. 
As it is noted in Gary Born’s dissenting opinion,91 
whoever has referred to the margin of  appreciation in 
a rigorous way states that it consists in the recognition 
of  a certain degree of  discretion to ECtHR Contracting 
Parties by the ECtHR when evaluating the legitimacy 
of  limitations to conventional rights imposed by States 
for reasons of  public interest.92 This doctrine has been 
91  Para. 181  In particular, at para. 183, with regard to Art. 1 of  
Protocol 1 of  the ECHR, Mr. Born explains that such a rule “has 
been interpreted by the ECtHR to afford a very wide margin of  
appreciation to governmental authorities with respect to what con-
stitutes ‘public interest’. Among other things, the ECtHR has held 
that ‘it should respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is in the 
public interest unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable 
foundation’. This interpretation of  the Convention and its Protocols 
is supported by the traveaux preparatoires of  the Convention, which 
indicate that the drafters intended to incorporate a ‘very wide’ mar-
gin of  appreciation”. The Dissenting Arbitrator, in this statement, 
referred to James and others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Series A No. 
98, 21 February 1986, para. 46. It is possible to refer, in this regard, 
also to Broniovski v. Poland, ECtHR, Application No. 31443/96, Judg-
ment, 22 June 2005, para. 149.
92  See, inter alia, YOUROW, Howard Charles. The Margin of  
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applied by the ECtHR in well-defined circumstances, i.e. 
where the limiting measure is enshrined in a law, whe-
re it is necessary to realize a certain scope and where 
it is proportionate to its goal.93 Moreover, in order to 
grant a margin of  appreciation to Contracting Parties, 
the Court requires that Contracting States do not have 
consistent views on the content of  a certain right and 
the level of  protection that States shall grant in relation 
to it. The different ways in which States conceive the 
same right justify different levels of  interference with 
the enjoyment of  such a right by people.94 If  interpreted 
in this way, the margin of  appreciation reveals itself  to 
be a direct consequence of  the principle of  subsidiarity, 
one of  the cornerstones of  the ECHR system, accor-
ding to which the ECtHR shall be deferential towar-
ds State authorities, which are better suited to regulate 
matters of  public interest within their territory. As it has 
been explained by Prof. Samantha Besson, “States have 
the primary responsibility to secure human rights under 
jurisdiction; and international human rights institutions 
have a complementary review power in cases where 
international minimal human rights standards are not 
protected effectively domestically”.95 The margin of  ap-
Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of  European Rights Juris-
prudence. Connecticut Journal of  International Law, v. 3, p. 118, 2011, 
who defined the doctrine as the “breadth of  deference” which the 
ECtHR gives to domestic decision-makers. See also the references 
contained in footnote 94 below.  
93  There are plenty of  examples in which the margin of  apprecia-
tion doctrine has been used by the ECtHR. One of  them concerns 
the possibility to limit the right to wear the islamic veil. In this re-
gard see NIGRO, Raffaella. The Margin of  Appreciation Doctrine 
and the Case-Law of  the European Court of  Human Rights on the 
Islamic Veil. Human Rights Review, v. 11, p. 531, 2010. Other cases 
concerns, e.g., the possibility to display crucifixes in public places, 
on which see the decision of  the European Court of  Human Rights, 
Grand Chamber, Lautsi and Others v. Italy, Application No. 30814/06, 
Judgment of  18 March 2011. 
94  See, inter alia, PALOMBINO, n. 8 above, pp. 137-138. For the 
history and development of  the margin of  appreciation see MAC-
DONALD, Ronald St. John. The Margin of  Appreciation in the Jurispru-
dence of  the European Court of  Human Rights, in International Law at the 
Times of  Its Codification: Essays in Honour of  Roberto Ago. Giuffré, 
1987. p. 187; BJORGE, Eirik. Been There, Done That: The Margin 
of  Appreciation and International Law. Cambridge Journal of  Interna-
tional and Comparative Law, v. 4, p. 181, 2015.  In order to understand 
how the Court has applied the doctrine, see, inter alia, STAIANO, 
Fulvia. (In)Comparable Situations: Same-Sex Couples’ Right to Mar-
riage in European Case Law. 2017. p. 1. Disponível em: <diwww.
federalismi.it>.
95  BESSON, Samantha. Subsidiarity in International Human 
Rights Law – What is Subsidiarity about Human Rights. The Ameri-
can Journal of  Jurisprudence, v. 61, p. 69, 2016. See, in this regard, also 
NIGRO, Raffaella. Il margine di apprezzamento e la giurisprudenza 
della Corte europea dei diritti umani sul velo islâmico. Diritti umani 
preciation, therefore, “address[es] the limits or intensity 
of  the review of  the European Court of  Human Rights 
in view of  its status as an international tribunal”.96 This 
conception of  the margin of  appreciation has been de-
fined as “structural”97 and we could also describe it as 
“technical”, in light of  the fact that it is based on the 
rationale behind the development of  the doctrine by 
the ECtHR.
However, as it has been noted by Prof. George Let-
sas, this is not the only meaning that has been given to 
the margin of  appreciation.98 According to the “subs-
tantive” conception of  the doctrine, it “address[es] the 
relationship between individual freedoms and collective 
goals”.99 When applying this conception of  the doctrine, 
the Court recognizes a violation of  a right, but allows it 
in light of  the necessity to protect public interests. This 
understanding of  the doctrine requires “a fair balance 
between individual rights and collective standards”100 
and the most important step in its application consists 
in the evaluation of  the proportionality of  the measu-
re.101 In Letsas’s words “[t]he principle of  proportiona-
e diritto internazionale, v. 2, p. 71, 2008. The margin of  appreciation 
has been therefore correctly related to the concept of  public policy 
in private international law; see SALERNO, Francesco. Il vincolo al 
rispetto dei diritti dell’uomo nel sistema delle fonti del diritto inter-
nazionale privato. Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, v. 8, p. 556, 2014. 
It is worth noting that this is not the only possible meaning of  the 
subsidiarity principle, which has also a so-called “horizontal func-
tion” (opposed to the one we discuss in the present article, named 
“vertical subsidiarity”), aimed at regulating States’ intervention in 
relation (and in substitution) of  private parties’ initiative. See, in this 
regard, BOCCHINI, Francesco. Contributo allo studio del diritto sussidi-
ario. Rome: Aracne Editrice, 2012. p. 1. 
96  LETSAS, George. Two Concepts of  the Margin of  Apprecia-
tion”. Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies, v. 26, p. 706, 2006.
97  LETSAS, George. Two Concepts of  the Margin of  Apprecia-
tion”. Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies, v. 26, p. 706, 2006.
98  See also EL BOUDOUHI, Saïda. A comparative approach of  
the national margin of  appreciation doctrine before the ECtHR, in-
vestment tribunals and WTO dispute settlement bodies. EUI Work-
ing Papers RSCAS 2015/27, 2015. p. 1. Similarly to Letsas, this Au-
thor recognize that the margin of  appreciation can be understood 
“as a concept” referring to the “idea of  leeway, discretion or space 
for manoeuvre that is granted by the normative structure of  the 
law” or “as a doctrine” or “stricto sensu”, i.e. as the ECtHR has techni-
cally developed it.
99  EL BOUDOUHI, Saïda. A comparative approach of  the na-
tional margin of  appreciation doctrine before the ECtHR, invest-
ment tribunals and WTO dispute settlement bodies. EUI Working 
Papers RSCAS 2015/27, 2015. p. 706.
100  EL BOUDOUHI, Saïda. A comparative approach of  the 
national margin of  appreciation doctrine before the ECtHR, invest-
ment tribunals and WTO dispute settlement bodies. EUI Working 
Papers RSCAS 2015/27, 2015. p. 711.
101  For a similar approach it is possible to mention BURKE-
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lity is by far the most important and most demanding 
criterion for whether the limitation of  a right was per-
missible under the Convention. If  the interference is 
found to be proportionate or ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ the Convention right has not been violated”.102 
This understanding of  the margin of  appreciation doc-
trine could also be defined, in this author’s opinion, as 
“a-technical”, because – on the one hand – it is not an-
chored to strict requirements as it happens for the te-
chnical conception of  the doctrine, and – on the other 
hand – it essentially seems to be an application of  the 
autonomous principle of  proportionality.103
4.2. The Applicability of the Two Meanings 
of Margin of Appreciation in Investment 
Arbitration
It is the present author’s opinion that, as stated by 
Mr. Born’s Dissenting Opinion in Philip Morris,104 the 
technical (or structural) conception of  the margin of  
appreciation is completely unsuitable for the investment 
arbitration context with particular regard to the evalua-
tion of  FET violations.105 The reasons for this opinion 
are easy to elucidate. 
The ECHR is a multilateral convention aimed at en-
WHITE, William; VON STADEN, Andreas. Private Litigation in a 
Public Law Sphere: The Standard of  Review in Investor-State Arbi-
tration. Yale Journal of  International Law, v. 35, p. 307-308, 2010, who 
said that “practice suggests a relationship between the margin of  
appreciation and proportionality that we found both compelling and 
jurisprudentially useful. In practice, the Court uses the margin of  
appreciation to inform its proportionality analysis. In other words, 
when the Court grants a wide margin of  appreciation to states in a 
given issue area, it then transforms that wide margin into a greater 
degree of  deference to the national government in the proportion-
ality balancing process which follows. A wide margin results in a 
less stringent proportionality test. A narrow margin leads to stricter 
review in the proportionality test”.
102  LETSAS, George. Two Concepts of  the Margin of  Apprecia-
tion”. Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies, v. 26, p. 711, 2006.
103  Instead, the difference between the “technical” margin of  
appreciation and proportionality is clearly explained in DONATI, 
Filippo; MILAZZO, Pietro. La dottrina del margine di apprezza-
mento nella giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo. 
In: FALZEA, Paolo; SPADARO, Antonino; VENTURA, Luigi. 
(Ed.). La Corte costituzionale e le corti d’Europa. Giappichelli, 2003. p. 
110-111.
104  See para. 184.
105  The difficult applicability of  the margin of  appreciation has 
been analysed also with regard to the International Court of  Justice. 
See RAGNI, Chiara. Standard of  Review and the Margin of  Ap-
preciation Before the International Court of  Justice. In: GRUSZC-
ZYNSKI, Lukasz; WERNER, Wouter. Deference in International Courts 
and Tribunals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. p. 319.
suring the protection of  human rights in 47 States whe-
re, as obvious, there are substantial cultural differences 
in the perception of  such rights. This, in turn, deter-
mines very different understandings of  the reasons for 
which the rights protected by the Convention could be 
limited. It suffices here to mention questions such as 
the possibility to wear the Islamic veil in relation to the 
freedom of  religion protected by Art. 9 of  the ECHR. 
Each State has – based on its own policy choices – a 
different understanding of  the ways in which such a ri-
ght can be limited.106 The ECtHR, therefore, has been 
almost obliged in recognizing, through the margin of  
appreciation doctrine, a degree of  flexibility in the ap-
plication of  conventional rights with respect to which 
uniformity among States is very difficult to be found. 
This approach finds support also in the consideration 
that, according to the above-mentioned principle of  
subsidiarity, the Court is to be considered in a worse 
situation (with respect to State authorities) in making 
evaluations involving substantial domestic policy con-
siderations.107 Finally, it is to be noted that the rights of  
the ECHR in relation to which the application of  the 
margin of  appreciation has been recognized (i.e. Art. 8, 
9, 10, 11 and 15) all present a similar structure: the first 
paragraph draws the protected right and the second ex-
plains the conditions in presence of  which a State may 
limit the enjoyment of  such a right. 
Contrariwise, BITs are bilateral treaties for the pro-
motion and protection of  investments made by na-
tionals of  one of  the Contracting Parties in the other 
Contracting Party. Bilateral investment treaties involve 
certain limitations to State sovereignty that have been 
spontaneously accepted by States with the aim of  at-
tracting foreign capitals. They are not even compara-
ble to a bill of  rights such as the ECHR. Furthermore, 
considering that they do not involve rights in relation 
to which there are different cultural perceptions among 
States, they do not involve problems such as the lack of  
uniformity in the application of  human rights. BITs do 
106  See NIGRO, n. 95 above, p. 82. 
107  For a meaningful discussion of  the conditions behind the 
growth of  the margin of  appreciation doctrine in the ECHR frame-
work, see SAPIENZA, Rosario. Sul margine di apprezzamento 
statale nel sistema della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo. 
Rivista di diritto internazionale, v. 64, p. 589, 1991. See also TOMASI, 
Laura, Art. 8, in BARTOLE, Sergio; DE SENA, Pasquale; ZAGRE-
BELSKY, Vladimiro. (Ed.), n. 42 above, p. 307; TANZARELLA, 
Palmina. Il margine di apprezzamento. In: CARTABIA, Marta (Ed.). 
I diritti in azione. Bologna: il Mulino, 2007. p. 145. 
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not involve problems of  subsidiarity, because there is 
not a permanent Court, such as the ECtHR, which – for 
its superordinate hierarchical position – has the cons-
tant power to strongly limit the policy choices which 
can be made by States. The standards of  treatment for 
foreign investors contained in BITs do not present the 
structure of  the rights contained in the ECHR: in prin-
ciple, when States violate such standards, they should 
compensate foreign investors. In conclusion, it does not 
seem possible to even imagine a way in which the struc-
tural conception of  the margin of  appreciation can find 
a place in investment arbitration.108 Hence, it is no sur-
prise that when arbitral tribunals had the opportunity to 
evaluate the applicability of  the margin of  appreciation 
in international investment law they usually refused that 
option.109 In conclusion, borrowing Gary Born’s wor-
ds in Philip Morris, it is possible to say that the ECHR 
“was drafted and accepted in a specific geographical 
and historical context, in relation to a particular human 
rights instrument. The reasons that led to the acceptan-
ce of  the “margin of  appreciation” in the context of  
the ECHR are not necessarily transferable to other con-
texts, including specifically to a BIT”.110 Confirmation 
of  this approach may be found also in other arbitral 
awards. In Siemens the Tribunal stated that “article 1 of  
the First Protocol to the ECHR permits a margin of  
appreciation not found in customary international law 
or the [applicable] BIT”.111 Similarly, in von Pezold, the 
Tribunal said that “[d]ue caution should be exercised 
in importing concepts from other legal regimes (in this 
case European human rights law) without a solid basis 
for doing so. Balancing competing (and non-absolute) 
human rights and the need to grant States a margin of  
108  A similar conclusion, but partially based on different reasons, 
has been reached by ARATO, Julian. The Margin of  Appreciation in 
International Investment Law. Virginia Journal of  International Law, v. 
54, p. 545, 2014. See also TALLENT, Kassi. The Tractor in the Jun-
gle: Why Investment Arbitration Tribunals Should Reject a Margin 
of  Appreciation Doctrine. In: LAIRD, Ian; WEILER, Todd (Ed.). 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law. Huntington – NY: 
Juris Net, 2010. v. 3. p. 111; VASANI, Sarah. Bowing to the Queen: 
Rejecting the Margin of  Appreciation Doctrine in International In-
vestment Law. In: LAIRD, WEILER, p. 137. For other critics to the 
possible applicability of  the doctrine in international investment law 
see ALVAREZ, Jose E; KHAMSI, Kathryn. The Argentine Crisis 
and Foreign Investors. In: SAUVANT, Karl (Ed.) The Yearbook on 
International Law and Policy 2008/2009. 2009.p. 440.
109  See Quasar de Valores SICAV S.A. (et al.) v. The Russian Federa-
tion, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Award, 20/07/2012, para. 22. 
110  Para. 185.
111  Siemens v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, 
06/02/2007, para. 354.
appreciation when making those balancing decisions is 
well established in human rights law, but the Tribunal is 
not aware that the concept has found much support in 
international investment law”.112
The discourse is different with regard to the appli-
cability of  the a-technical (or substantial) margin of  
appreciation, which – as we have seen – de facto corres-
ponds to a proportionality analysis of  state measures. 
As it has been correctly stated,113 proportionality is an 
integral part of  the fair and equitable treatment stan-
dard, which is functional to the ascertainment of  the 
violation of  such a standard. Proportionality operates 
particularly in the cases where it is necessary to balance 
the legitimate expectations of  investors with the sove-
reign functions of  host States.114 In this regard, it has 
112  Bernhard von Pezold and Others v. Republic of  Zimbabwe, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/15, Award, 28/07/2015, paras. 465-466. See also 
KASTSELAS, Anna. Do Investment Treaties Prescribe a Deferen-
tial Standard of  Review?. Michigan Journal of  International Law, v. 34, 
p. 139, 2012. The proposed approach finds indirect confirmation 
also in the scholarship who apparently recognized the applicability 
of  the margin of  appreciation in investment arbitration. It is pos-
sible to mention, in this regard, BURKE-WHITE, VON STADEN, 
n. 101 above, p. 324, who said that often “tribunals invoked [the 
discussed standard] in potentially contradictory ways. In particular, 
more recent ICSID tribunals have made explicit reference to the 
least restrictive alternative test, the margin of  appreciation and good 
faith review. The result has been a melding or, perhaps, a confusing 
of  approaches, rather than the emergence of  a clear standard of  
review for public law arbitration”. The same Authors, at 328, rec-
ognize that “ICSID jurisprudence urgently needs a well-considered 
analysis of  the available standards of  review in public law arbitra-
tions and the reasons why a particular standard are appropriate to 
the public law subject matter of  these arbitrations and the text of  
the treaty being interpreted”. These Authors, however, in the end 
say at 336 that the application proportionality is not the correct way 
of  solving this issue because arbitrators are allegedly ill-suited to 
carry out this balancing process. The present author disagrees with 
this statement: first, all deferential doctrines recognize a certain de-
gree of  subjectivism to arbitrators and there is no reason to prefer 
one instead of  another. Second, the reason why the parties choose 
certain arbitrators is exactly their competence and sensibility in solv-
ing the specific issues and there is apparently no reason to believe 
that they would badly carry out their task.
113  PALOMBINO, n. 9 above, p. 164-165. Contrariwise, see 
XIULI, n. 74 above, p. 639. Palombino’s approach as to the inclu-
sion of  proportionality as a functional element necessary to verify 
whether a violation of  the fair and equitable treatment took place 
seems reinforced, inter alia, by the Glamis Gold decision, where the 
proportionality test was used in order to evaluate whether the inves-
tor’s legitimate expectations have been violated. See Glamis Gold Ltd. 
v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, 08/06/2009, para. 803  Other 
references are contained in Palombino’s book, at 167 f.
114  See STONE-SWEET, Alec; MATTHEWS, Jud. Propor-
tionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism. Columbia Journal 
of  Transnational Law, v. 47, p. 73, 2008, stating that proportionality 
analysis has become “the preferred procedure [...] for managing [...] 
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been correctly noted that the FET itself  has a balancing 
nature and that BITs do not contain absolute rights.115 
It is possible to mention, in this regard, the Suez award, 
where – while discussing about the fair and equitable 
treatment standard – the Tribunal expressly mentioned 
the balancing process which is typical of  the proportio-
nality analysis which is made in domestic constitutio-
nal law: “[i]n interpreting the meaning of  ‘just’ or ‘fair 
and equitable treatment’ to be accorded to investors, 
the Tribunal must balance the legitimate and reasona-
ble expectations of  the Claimants with [...] (the) right 
to regulate the provision of  a vital public service”.116 
Similarly, in Occidental, the Tribunal determined that “the 
test [for ascertaining a FET violation] at the end of  the 
day will remain one of  overall judgment, balancing the 
interests of  the State against those of  the individual, to 
assess whether the particular sanction is a proportionate 
response in the particular circumstances”.117
Obviously, in such a balancing process due weight 
shall be given to the sovereign functions of  the State 
(requesting Tribunals to be deferential towards States’ 
policy choices) due to the hybrid (public/private) natu-
re of  investment arbitration, in which the principle of  
equality of  the parties shall be mitigated by the presence 
of  a sovereign entity.118 Deference, therefore, is part of  
an alleged conflict between two rights claims, or between a right 
provision and a legitimate state [...] interest.”
115  See HAYNES, Jason. The Evolving Nature of  the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment (FET) Standard: Challenging Its Increasing 
Pervasiveness in Light of  Developing Countries’ Concerns – The 
Case for Regulatory Rebalancing. Journal of  World Investment & Trade, 
v. 14, p. 114, 2013; VANDEVELDE, Kenneth. A Unified Theory 
of  Fair and Equitable Treatment. New York University Journal of  In-
ternational Law and Politics, v. 43, p. 43, 2010; DOLZER, Rudolf. Fair 
and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours. Santa Clara Journal of  
International Law, v. 12, p. 7, 2014.
116  Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and In-
teragua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability 30/07/2010, para. 216.
117  Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of  Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, 05/10/2012, para. 417.
118  See HENCKELS, n. 74 above, p. 223; VALENTI, Mara, The 
protection of  general interests of  host States in the application of  
the fair and equitable treatment standard. In: SACERDOTI, Gior-
gio. The Proliferation of  BITs: Conflicts of  Treaties, Proceedings 
and Awards. In: SAUVANT, Karl et al. (Ed.). Appeals Mechanism in 
International Investment Disputes. Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 35. 
Analogous considerations on the non-absolute nature of  rights con-
ferred to individuals has been made in the ECHR context by CAN-
NIZZARO, n. 9 above, p. 76. Cannizzaro has noted that in the hu-
man rights context, as it happens for the FET, the lack of  a precise 
normative definition of  certain human rights leaves discretion to 
States in applying implicit limitations of  such rights. In these cases, 
obviously, the ECtHR has recognized the States’ freedom and has 
the proportionality analysis carried out by arbitrators. 
Borrowing Saïda El Boudouhi’s terminology,119 this 
means that the margin of  appreciation “as a concept”, 
i.e. the general recognition of  a space of  manoeuvre 
for State authorities, is an implied assumption of  the 
proportionality analysis which finds place in investment 
arbitration (contrary, as we have seen, to the margin of  
appreciation “as a doctrine” technically developed by 
the ECtHR and applicable only in the presence of  cer-
tain well-defined circumstances). 
This has finally led to the emergence of  the concept 
of  legitimate expectations by induction, which means 
that investors can legitimately expect that a State may 
not amend a particular legal framework without incur-
ring in responsibility only in presence of  specific commit-
ments towards them.120 Indeed, taking into account the 
three-pronged structure of  proportionality, and in par-
ticular the proportionality stricto sensu requirement,121 it 
is possible to say that an investor’s legitimate expecta-
tions on the stability of  a certain legal framework are 
justified only if  and when a State has assumed speci-
fic commitments towards such an investor. Indeed, in 
this latter case a measure violating such commitments 
is likely to result in a disproportionate violation of  the 
investor’s rights, due to the very high level of  reliance 
that the investor put in good faith on the circumstance 
that the host State legal framework was not going to 
vary.122 In this author’s opinion, such a balancing exer-
cise is exactly what the Philip Morris Majority intended 
not condemned those limitations. With regard to the concept of  def-
erence in investment arbitration see SCHILL, Stephan W. Deference 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard 
of  Review. Journal of  International Dispute Settlement, v. 3, p. 577, 2012; 
CHEYNE, Ilona. Deference and the Use of  Public Policy Excep-
tions in International Courts and Tribunals. In: GRUSZCZYNSKI, 
Lukasz; WERNER, Wouter. Deference in International Courts and Tri-
bunals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. p. 38; HENCKELS, 
Caroline. The Role of  Standard of  Review and the Importance of  
Deference in Investor – State Arbitration. In: GRUSZCZYNSKI, 
Lukasz; WERNER, Wouter. Deference in International Courts and Tribu-
nals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. p. 113.
119  EL BOUDOUHI, n. 98 above, p. 1-5.
120  See, for a meaningful explanation of  the concept of  legiti-
mate expectations by induction, as well as for the development of  
this idea, PALOMBINO, n. 9 above, p. 139  See also PUMA, n. 3 
above, p. 232-233.
121  It is worth here recalling that the proportionality stricto sensu 
analysis requires a concrete evaluation of  the proportionality of  the 
goals of  the host State in relation to the legal means it has adopted 
for reaching such goals.
122  See, inter alia, EL BOUDOUHI, n. 98 above, p. 14. for an 
analysis of  the balancing approach of  investment tribunals.
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when referring to “margin of  appreciation”:123 Firstly, 
the Majority recognized that Uruguay’s regulations were 
enacted in the pursuance of  the State’s public function 
and, therefore, deserved a certain degree of  deference, 
and, secondly, the Majority stated that, in concreto, they 
were “reasonable” and not disproportionate when they 
were adopted and therefore justified a violation of  the 
investors’ legitimate expectations.124 As better discussed 
below in this Section, however, the Majority refused to 
make a careful analysis of  the satisfactions of  the three 
prongs of  proportionality and this renders the legal 
path followed in the decision not convincing. 
It is also to be noted that Authors who defend the 
applicability of  the margin of  appreciation outside the 
ECHR context never discussed the possibility of  ap-
plying the features of  the doctrine as technically deve-
loped by the ECtHR. This seems to be confirmed by 
the words used by Yuval Shany, who talks about the 
applicability of  “margin of  appreciation like doctrines”125 
or “’margin of  appreciation type’ decision making metho-
dology” (emphasis added) outside the ECtHR, thus 
implictly recognizing that the technical conception of  
the doctrine cannot find place outside the ECHR fra-
mework.126 Similarly Burke-White and von Staden me-
rely refer to the margin of  appreciation as a theory of  
deference against State actions, not taking into account 
all the other elements that compose the technical con-
ception of  the doctrine.127 These authors expressly ack-
nowledge that “arbitral tribunals have, if  less frequently 
and prominently, applied standards of  review similar to 
the margin of  appreciation, often using the term explicitly” 
(emphasis added).128 Finally, El Boudouhi explained that 
123  See para. 401.
124  With this particular regard, see paras. 409-410 and 418-420.
125  SHANY, Yuval. All Roads Lead to Strasbourg?: Application 
of  the Margin of  Appreciation Doctrine by the European Court 
of  Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee. 2017. 
p. 30. Disponível em: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2925652>.
126  SHANY, Yuval. Toward a General Margin of  Appreciation 
Doctrine in International Law?. European Journal of  International Law, 
v. 16, p. 928, 2005.
127  BURKE-WHITE, William; VON STADEN, Andreas. In-
vestment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation 
and Application of  Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties. Virginia Journal of  International Law, v. 48, p. 370, 
2008.
128  BURKE-WHITE, William; VON STADEN, Andreas. In-
vestment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation 
and Application of  Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties. Virginia Journal of  International Law, v. 48, p. 310, 
2008.
the reference in investment arbitration always occurs 
to the margin of  appreciation “as a concept” (i.e. as a 
synonymous of  deference) and not “as a doctrine” (i.e. 
as technically developed by the ECtHR).129 As the latter 
mentioned Author explains “it must be stressed again 
that the mere use of  the words ‘margin of  appreciation’ 
or ‘margin of  discretion’ does not, in itself, amount to 
the use of  the doctrine”.130 The same happens in the 
case law. We could start from quoting the Philip Mor-
ris decision, where the Tribunal, when referring to the 
margin of  appreciation, merely said that “[t]he respon-
sibility for public health measures rests with the gover-
nment and investment tribunals should pay great defe-
rence to governmental judgments of  national needs in 
matters such as the protection of  public health”.131 In 
some other cases Tribunals discussed a margin of  ap-
preciation to be granted to host States, but – as noted by 
Mr. Born in his Dissenting Opinion – a careful reading 
of  the awards reveals that arbitrators were simply saying 
that it is a duty of  Tribunals to apply a deferential stan-
dard of  review of  States’ actions.132 This is expressly 
said in Lemire, where the Tribunal made reference to the 
high level of  deference which international law generally 
extends to the rights of  domestic authorities in regula-
ting matters within their own borders, especially in cases 
where the State’s cultural identity is at stake.133 Similarly, 
in Electrabel, the Tribunal had to evaluate whether the in-
troduction of  a pricing regulation by Hungary was to be 
considered as a violation of  the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard; Arbitrators recognized the sovereign 
role of  the State in taking this kind of  measures and 
the deference which tribunals owe to sovereign deci-
sions, but avoided any kind of  discussion regarding the 
margin of  appreciation.134 Finally, in Loewen, Sir Chris-
topher Greenwood stated that “international law allows 
a broad margin of  discretion to each State in the way it 
organizes its legal system”.135 As for the other cases, this 
is a mere reference to States’ discretion and not to the 
129  EL BOUDOUHI, n. 98 above, p. 15.
130  EL BOUDOUHI, n. 98 above, p. 16.
131  Para. 399.
132  Born’s Dissenting Opinion appended to the Philip Morris 
award, para. 189.
133  Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 14/01/2010, para 505.
134  Electrabel v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, Applicability and Liability, 30/11/2012, para. 8.35.
135  Loewen v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 
Opinion of  Sir Christopher Greenwood appended to the Award, 
26/06/2003, para. 65.
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ECtHR doctrine. 
However, as we have tried to demonstrate above, 
deference is to be considered as a part of  the broader 
proportionality analysis to be carried out in the evalua-
tion of  the investors’ legitimate expectations. Obviou-
sly, the broader will be the wording of  the standard of  
treatment to be applied, the bigger will be the space of  
manoeuvre for State authorities and the related defe-
rence that international arbitrators should pay to State 
actions in their proportionality analysis.136 Indeed, such 
a deference has been manifested by arbitral tribunals in 
particular when they had to evaluate violations of  broad 
standards, such as the fair and equitable treatment, al-
leged caused by States’ regulations concerning public 
services, i.e. those “services which are provided and re-
gulated based on non-commercial public interests and 
on the need for the provision of  such services in a way 
the market cannot achieve”.137
Finally, it is worth mentioning the Continental Ca-
sualty Company v. Argentina award,138 where the Tribunal 
mentioned the margin of  appreciation when referring 
to the discretion that States enjoy in deciding the con-
tours of  their “own security interest”. In this regard, it 
is to be noted that the Tribunal was here applying a BIT 
provision which expressly authorized Argentina to take 
measures to protect “its own security interest” and, of  
course, the same provision allowed the Respondent Sta-
te to discretionally identify what kind of  interests were 
involved in that category. No reference to the doctrine 
as developed by the ECtHR is present in the Continental 
Casualty Company award.
In light of  the above, it is worth concluding the 
present analysis with some final remarks regarding the 
approach endorsed by the Philip Morris Tribunal. As dis-
cussed above, it appears that the Majority of  Arbitra-
tors made recourse to the margin of  appreciation as a 
way for paying deference to the measures enacted by 
the host State. In doing so, it seems that the Philip Mor-
ris majority did not apply the technical meaning of  the 
136  SHANY, Yuval. Toward a General Margin of  Appreciation 
Doctrine in International Law?. European Journal of  International Law, 
v. 16, p. 914, 2005. 
137  See KRAJEWSKI, Markus. Investment Law and Public Ser-
vices. In: BUNGENBERG Marc et al. (Ed.). International Investment 
Law. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2015. p. 1629. The importance which ar-
bitral tribunals are giving to public services is particularly evident in 
the above-mentioned Urbaser award, n. 4 above, para. 603.
138  ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 05/09/2008, para. 181.
margin of  appreciation doctrine. However, as explained 
by Born’s Dissenting Opinion,139 by refusing to evalua-
te the concrete suitability of  Uruguayans’ measures to 
reach their scope and to carry out a meaningful analysis 
of  the three prongs of  proportionality in the present 
case, the Tribunal seems not to have correctly applied 
the proportionality analysis which is required in the eva-
luation of  a FET violation. This approach is somewhat 
confusing and, for this reason, the opinion of  the dis-
senting arbitrator – who suggests the necessity to carry 
out a meaningful proportionality analysis with respect 
to the disputed Uruguayan measures - is certainly more 
shareable. 
5. fInAl  conclusIons
The analysis carried out in this article started from 
the recent decision in the Philip Morris v. Uruguay dis-
pute, where the Tribunal unanimously recognized the 
existence, the customary status and the applicability by 
way of  systemic interpretation of  the so-called police 
powers (or power to regulate) doctrine and, by majority, 
recognized that the margin of  appreciation doctrine – 
as developed in the ECtHR context – applied in BIT 
arbitrations. While this decision is certainly to be welco-
med for its attempt to take into due consideration the 
sovereign prerogatives of  respondent States in invest-
ment arbitration, it does not seem entirely convincing 
from the point of  view of  the legal path that Arbitra-
tors decided to follow. Hence, this article has tried to 
analyze the current status regarding the applicability of  
the power to regulate, the margin of  appreciation and 
the proportionality principle in investment arbitration. 
Concerning the doctrine of  the power to regulate 
we have demonstrated that, as of  today, it cannot be 
considered as a rule of  customary international law 
which can find autonomous application in investment 
arbitration. It is surely possible to say that existing treaty 
practice and arbitral case law are establishing a trend 
towards a broader recognition of  this doctrine, but it 
does not appear equally possible to say that the two re-
quirements of  custom, i.e. diuturnitas and opinio juris sive 
necessitatis, have been met by the police powers doctri-
ne. However, the present paper has tried to show that 
the sovereign prerogatives of  host States can be taken 
139  See para. 172.
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into due account by arbitral tribunals when evaluating 
indirect expropriations through an application of  the 
principle of  proportionality, to which the concept of  
deference towards State authority is inherent.
On the other hand, as to the margin of  appreciation 
doctrine, we have tried to demonstrate that it can be un-
derstood both technically, i.e. “as a doctrine” developed 
by the ECtHR, and “a-technically”, i.e. as a synonymous 
of  deference, and that its applicability in investment ar-
bitration depends on how adjudicators understand the 
concept. The first meaning of  margin of  appreciation, 
typical in the ECtHR context, is in direct relationship 
with the principle of  subsidiarity and anchors the appli-
cability of  the doctrine to certain specific requirements 
established by the ECtHR which do not exist in the BIT 
context. However, the argument has been put forward 
whereby arbitral tribunals may resort to the margin of  
appreciation in a substantial (or a-technical) sense, i.e. 
regarding this doctrine as a balancing technique which 
involves a deferential approach towards State sovereign-
ty and ends up overlapping with the proportionality 
analysis.
In conclusion, while the applicability of  the police 
powers and of  the margin of  appreciation doctrines still 
appear to be doubtful in investment arbitration, it see-
ms that a deeper analysis of  the potential applications 
of  the proportionality principle could lead arbitral tri-
bunals to resolve balancing issues and recognize a due 
level of  deference towards States without making re-
course to judicial borrowing operations that sometimes 
turn out to be misleading.
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